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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON INFORMATION AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS
Kevin C. Smith
Robert E. Verrecchia
In the first chapter (”Option Prices and Disclosure: Theory and Measurement”), I develop
an option-pricing model that formally incorporates a disclosure event. The model suggests
that an understanding of a firm’s disclosure policies can aid in efficiently pricing its options.
Specifically, I find that 1) more informative disclosures lead to greater volatility in the
firm’s equity price upon their release, raising pre-disclosure option prices and 2) disclosures
that are more informative for good-versus-bad news lead to skewness in the firm’s equity
price upon their release, adjusting the relative pre-disclosure prices of out-of-the-money and
in-the-money options. Using these results, I develop measures of a disclosure’s properties
based on option prices that may be calculated on an event-specific basis.
In the second chapter (”Additional Analyses of Option Prices and Disclosure”), I conduct
further studies of the relationship between disclosure and option prices. First, I study the
relationship between option prices and disclosure in static and dynamic models of voluntary
disclosure. Second, I extend the measures developed in the first chapter to the case in
which a firm’s fundamentals are asymmetric. Third, I show that option-based measures of
volatility and skewness developed in prior literature are not able to function as measures
of a disclosure’s properties. Finally, I show that the results in the first chapter apply for a
multitude of disclosure properties found throughout the literature.
In the third chapter (”Financial Markets with Trade on Risk and Return”), I develop a
model in which risk-averse investors trade on private information regarding both a stock’s
expected payoff and risk. These investors may trade in the stock and a derivative whose
payoff is a function of the stock’s risk. I study the role played by the derivative, finding
iv
that it is used to speculate on future risk and to hedge risk uncertainty. Unlike prior
rational expectation models with derivatives, its price serves a valuable informational role,
communicating investors’ risk information. Finally, I find that the equity risk premium is
directly tied to the derivative price.
v
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PREFACE
In this series of essays, I study how the features of public and private information that
investors possess affect trade in and pricing of derivative securities. Derivative securities
play an unquestionably important role in the modern economy. For example, call and put
options are widely traded in order to speculate on private information and to share risk.
Moreover, ETFs tracking the CBOE’s volatility index (i.e., the VIX) are among the most
actively traded securities in the market. Investors expend immense effort pricing these
securities given the profits that can be made by predicting their returns.
To value derivative securities, investors utilize a multitude of models that take the process
followed by a derivative’s underlying security price as an (unmodeled) input and yield the
derivative’s theoretical value as an output (e.g., the Black Scholes, Heston, and Dupire
models). To apply these models, investors must first develop an estimate of this process.
Thus, investors’ valuations of a derivative hinge critically on what they know about the
underlying’s price process, including its volatility, skewness, kurtosis, etc. Investors’ infor-
mation regarding this price process may come from a variety of sources such as accounting
disclosures, market prices, statistical models, and private communication with management.
I examine how the types and properties of information that investors possess ultimately
influence derivative markets. My analysis deviates from traditional mathematical finance,
which addresses how to value derivatives when the underlying’s price process is common
knowledge among investors. Instead, I apply the framework of information economics, which
assumes that economic agents have rational expectations in order to address how they learn
and how their market interactions influence what they know.
In the first essay, I study how the properties of a public information release affect investors’
perception of the underlying’s future price, and in turn, the prices of derivatives. My focus
in this essay is on a specific type of derivative, equity options, and on a specific type of
information release, firm disclosures. In the second essay, I extend and generalize this
x
model. In the final essay, I examine a model in which investors have heterogenous private
information on both a securities’ mean and risk and can trade in both equity and derivative
markets.
xi
CHAPTER 1 : Option Prices and Disclosure: Theory and Measurement
1.1. Introduction
The effect of firms’ disclosures on their market prices is a topic at the core of accounting
research. This research is grounded in disclosure theory, which analyzes how a firm’s disclo-
sure affects its equity price when investors update their beliefs regarding the firm’s value in
response to the release of new information (e.g., Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988)). Yet,
empirical research also finds that firms’ disclosures impact their option prices.1 Further-
more, option-pricing theory suggests that these prices should impound investors’ beliefs
regarding an asset’s value differently than equity prices, as options have non-linear payoff
structures (e.g., Breeden and Litzenberger (1978)). This raises the theoretical questions of
how a disclosure impacts a firm’s option prices and whether the traded prices of options
can be used to assess the properties of a disclosure. To address these questions, I develop
an option-pricing model that incorporates a disclosure event and characterize its impact
on option prices. In the process, I demonstrate that option prices may be used to mea-
sure the disclosure’s properties on an event-specific basis, including the overall amount of
novel information it provides to investors and the amount of information it provides given
good-versus-bad news.
In developing my analysis, I depart from the framework applied in conventional option-
pricing models, such as the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model. This framework takes the
process followed by a firm’s stock price as an exogenous input, yielding an option’s price as
a function of this process. As a result, incorporating disclosure into these models requires
making a direct assumption on how the disclosure affects this process. For example, prior
literature incorporates a disclosure into the BSM model by assuming that it increases equity-
return volatility by an arbitrary amount around the disclosure’s announcement (Patell and
Wolfson (1979, 1981)). This approach is not well suited to address how a disclosure’s
1See Patell and Wolfson (1979, 1981), Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk (2009), Diavatopoulos et al.
(2012), Atilgan (2014), amongst others.
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properties influence its effect on option prices because it is not clear how these features
affect the firm’s equity-price process. To remedy this issue in my model, I begin with the
distribution of the firm’s cash flows, rather than stock returns, as the primitive. I then
derive the firm’s equity-price process as an endogenous outcome of the information that
investors receive regarding these cash flows, including a disclosure event. This enables me
to analyze how the disclosure’s properties impact the equity-price process, and in turn, how
they impact option prices.
I model the disclosure event as the public release of novel information to investors. This
release leads to an endogenous jump (i.e., discontinuity) in the firm’s equity price. While
consistent with empirical evidence (e.g., Lee and Mykland (2006)), this finding contradicts
prior studies of disclosure’s impact on option prices, which assume that disclosure has a
continuous impact on equity prices in order to satisfy the assumptions necessary to employ
the BSM framework. In my model, the distribution of the jump induced by the disclosure
is directly determined by the disclosure’s properties.
I focus on how two widely-studied properties of the disclosure affect the jump’s distribution:
the expected amount of information contained in the disclosure, which I term the disclo-
sure’s informativeness, and the amount of information it contains regarding “good” relative
to “bad” news, which I term the disclosure’s asymmetry. The disclosure’s informativeness
is relevant to studies of disclosure quality or decision usefulness to equity holders, while
the disclosure’s asymmetry is relevant to several settings found in prior work. For instance,
models of voluntary disclosure suggest that when firms have discretion in a disclosure deci-
sion, they release high-quality information when performing well and no information when
performing poorly (Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985), Jung and Kwon (1988)). Conversely,
specific accounting procedures may produce disclosures that are inherently more informa-
tive for losses than for gains (Basu (1997), Guay and Verrecchia (2006)). Likewise, models
of earnings management suggest that firms’ disclosures may be more informative for bad
than for good news (Laux and Stocken (2012), Bertomeu, Darrough, and Xue (2015)).
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Consistent with classical results from disclosure theory, I show that a more informative
disclosure increases the expected magnitude of the disclosure-induced equity-price jump
in proportion to investors’ prior uncertainty regarding the firm’s value (Holthausen and
Verrecchia (1988)). I then link the expected magnitude of this jump to the level of pre-
disclosure option prices. Since options have convex payouts, when the expected magnitude
of this jump is larger, the expected payoffs to options of all strikes increase, causing their
prices to rise. Therefore, pre-disclosure option prices of all strikes increase in the disclosure’s
informativeness in proportion to investors’ prior uncertainty regarding the firm’s value. This
result suggests that the run-up in implied volatility documented prior to earnings guidance
and earnings announcements might be broken down into the product of the amount of
novel information contained in earnings and investors’ prior uncertainty (Rogers, Skinner,
and Van Buskirk (2009), Van Buskirk (2011), Billings, Jennings, and Lev (2015)).2
Next, I show that a disclosure that is more informative for good-versus-bad news creates
positive skewness in the disclosure-induced equity-price jump. To understand this result,
consider a firm releasing earnings that might reflect either positive or negative news. Should
these earnings be more informative for good news than bad news, equity prices will respond
more strongly to positive earnings surprises and less strongly to negative earnings surprises.
This implies that the distribution of the jump in the equity price upon the earnings’ release
will exhibit more variation on the upside than the downside. I find that through this jump
skewness, disclosure’s asymmetry increases the pre-disclosure prices of out-of-the-money
(henceforth, OTM) call options relative to the prices of in-the-money (henceforth, ITM)
call options (and vice versa for the prices of put options). The reason is that jump skewness
implies a greater probability of equity-price spikes, which are necessary for an OTM call
option to pay off.
Conceptually, the model that I develop should yield option prices around disclosure events
2Implied volatility is derived using the Black-Scholes model, which does not hold in my setting as the
disclosure leads to a price jump and prices that are not log-normally distributed. Nonetheless, numerical
simulations suggest that implied volatility, while calculated using the “wrong” model, still behaves as stated
here.
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that are closer to options’ fundamental values than those generated by prior option-pricing
models, which do not explicitly consider the properties of firms’ disclosures. A subset of
prior option-pricing models incorporate jumps in firms’ prices with varying statistical dis-
tributions; these jumps are thought to capture information events including firm disclosures
(e.g., Merton (1976), Bates (1996)). However, in these models, the distribution of equity-
price jumps is taken as a given, and thus they must be implemented by using historical
data to estimate this distribution. This approach generally cannot fully capture the char-
acteristics of future disclosures, as this data may be limited and subject to noise, and firms’
accounting procedures may periodically change.
In the remainder my analysis, I assume that option traders at least in part incorporate
the features of a firm’s disclosures in their pricing model. In this case, I find that option
prices contain information regarding a disclosure’s properties that cannot be gleaned from
equity prices. To make this idea concrete, consider again the example of a firm announc-
ing its annual earnings. If earnings are above expectations, the magnitude of the resulting
equity-price reaction reveals how informative the firm’s earnings are given that the firm has
performed well, since the size of this reaction is proportional to the disclosure’s informative-
ness (Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988)). However, this price reaction does not reveal the
counterfactual of how informative the earnings report would have been if the firm instead
had performed poorly.
Importantly, both of these reactions are necessary to assess earnings’ overall informativeness
and asymmetry, since these properties depend on both how informative earnings are for good
and bad news. Researchers implicitly address this issue by using a time series of equity-
price reactions for a given firm or the equity-price reactions of a cross-section of comparable
firms. These approaches come at the expense of strong assumptions: the first assumes that
disclosure regimes are stationary, while the second assumes that a large subset of firms have
similar disclosure policies. This implies that neither approach can be applied to study the
4
properties of disclosures that are not similar to other firm disclosures.3
On the contrary, I find that a researcher can learn both the disclosure’s informativeness and
asymmetry by examining a single firm’s option prices prior to a single news event. Intu-
itively, the model predicts a one-to-one mapping between these properties of the disclosure
and observed pre-disclosure option prices. Thus, just as a researcher can use option prices
to back into the level of return volatility using the BSM model, so too can they use these
prices to back into a disclosure’s properties using my model. I demonstrate precisely how
to empirically measure a disclosure’s properties using the model. The measures I develop
obviate the need to assume stationarity of a firm’s disclosure policies or similarity across
firms and increase statistical power. Furthermore, they provide an ex-ante view of disclo-
sure’s properties, which may be more fitting to some empirical settings than the ex-post
view provided by equity-price measures (Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk (2009)).
Finally, my results imply that the BSM model should fail to explain observed option prices
around disclosure events. It has long been known that empirically-observed option prices
differ from those predicted by the BSM model, which suggests that the market uses more
sophisticated models (e.g., Derman and Miller (2016)). Prior work attributes empirical
inconsistencies with the BSM model to violations of its assumptions that stock prices are
continuous and log-normally distributed, but refrains from addressing the economic forces
that create these features in firms’ returns (e.g., Merton (1976), Heston (1993), Bakshi,
Cao, and Chen (1997), Dupire (1997)). My results suggest that disclosures cause firms’
returns to violate these assumptions since they induce discontinuities into returns that are
potentially skewed.4 An implication of this result is that around disclosure events, investors’
risk-aversion should play a role in pricing options even upon conditioning on the firm’s
equity price. I show that the magnitude of a disclosure’s effect on option prices depends
3Many types of 8-K’s might fall into this category, such as impairments, outcomes of director elections,
issuance of debt, etc., which capture events that occur infrequently.
4Dubinsky and Johannes (2006) also develop a model in which disclosure leads to a jump in a firm’s equity
price, but exogenously assume that the jump is Gaussian rather than formally modeling an information
release. Furthermore, they focus on measuring the degree of uncertainty created by a disclosure as opposed
to its properties.
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on investors’ risk aversion and the amount of systematic versus idiosyncratic information
contained in the disclosure.
Other work has studied the effect of jumps in equity prices on the prices of options. The
first such paper was Merton (1976), which models an exogenous jump in the stock price
and assumes that this jump is a diversifiable risk. Naik and Lee (1990) generalize his
model by instead taking the dividend process as primitive and assuming that there are non-
diversifiable jumps in this process. In Naik and Lee (1990), investors learn about future
dividends from present dividends; I build on their analysis by allowing investors to also
learn from a firm information release.
Prior literature also studies the information content of option prices, demonstrating that,
under certain assumptions, they can be used to (i) invert the risk-neutral density (Breeden
and Litzenberger (1978)), (ii) invert both state prices and investors’ belief distribution about
future returns (Ross (2015)), and (iii) derive the term structure of cost-of-equity capital
(Callen and Lyle (2014)). I contribute to this literature by demonstrating that because
the risk-neutral density around a disclosure is an invertible function of the disclosure’s
informativeness and asymmetry, one can invert these properties from option prices.
My paper is organized as follows: I first demonstrate the major findings in a parsimonious
two-state discrete-time framework with risk-neutral pricing (Section 1.2). In the remaining
sections, I extend the model to consider investor risk aversion, continuous trade, a general
prior distribution over the equity’s payoff, a general distribution of the disclosure given the
equity’s payoff, and multiple heterogeneous investors. In Appendix A.1, I develop empirical
measures of a disclosure’s properties using my results.
1.2. Parsimonious model
In this section, I develop a version of the model with two states, three periods and risk-
neutral pricing, which transparently conveys my main findings. In the subsequent sections,
I extend the model to consider investor risk aversion, continuous trade, and general dis-
6
Figure 1: Timeline.
tributions, and find that the results in this section continue to hold. To begin, consider a
risk-neutral representative investor who trades in a firm’s equity, a risk-free bond in unlim-
ited supply with return normalized to zero, and European call and put options. The firm’s
payoff takes the form of a dividend x̃ paid to its equity holders at the end of the model,
which takes values of xL or xH > xL. Ex ante, the market perceives xL and xH to be
equally likely.
Prior to the payment of the dividend, the firm releases a disclosure ỹ concerning the outcome
of x̃. The model’s timing is intended to reflect a scenario where the market anticipates this
disclosure and, prior to the disclosure, trades in both equity and options that expire after the
disclosure. Specifically, the model has three dates. First, there is an initial “pre-disclosure”
date (date 0) during which trade occurs in anticipation of the disclosure event. Then, at
date 1, the firm releases the disclosure ỹ and the market reopens. Finally, at date 2, the
dividend is paid. The timeline of the model is depicted in Figure 1.
The options traded by the investor take on strike prices k ∈ [xL, xH ] and mature at date 1
(i.e., after the disclosure’s release); call payoffs are defined as max (P1 − k, 0) and put payoffs
as max (k − P1, 0), where P1 is the firm’s price at date 1. I assume that the disclosure ỹ takes
one of two possible values that correspond to good and bad news, yH and yL, respectively,
where:
Pr (ỹ = yH |x̃ = xH) = λ− η (1.1)
Pr (ỹ = yL|x̃ = xL) = λ+ η,





. Let a disclosure regime correspond to a set of parameters (λ, η),
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which capture the disclosure’s statistical relationship with the firm’s performance. The
parameter λ captures the disclosure’s overall, or on-average, informativeness, as a larger
value of λ reflects a disclosure regime that is more likely to accurately reflect the true state
of the world. The parameter η captures the disclosure’s informativeness for good-versus-bad
news, which I also refer to as its asymmetry. As η rises, the investor’s outlook regarding
the firm’s performance rises more given good news and falls less given bad news, that is,
∂
∂η Pr (x̃ = xH |ỹ = yH) > 0 and
∂
∂η Pr (x̃ = xH |ỹ = yL) > 0.
The disclosure’s overall informativeness, as captured by λ, corresponds to the amount of
novel information it provides to investors, and thus applies to empirical studies that examine
the amount of valuation-relevant information a firm provides to investors. The disclosure’s
asymmetric informativeness, as captured by η, applies to at least two distinct empirical
settings. First, models of voluntary disclosure suggest that when allowed discretion in
accounting choices, firms release more information given good than bad performance, sug-
gesting that discretion corresponds to a larger level of η (Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985),
Jung and Kwon (1988)).5 Second, this notion of a disclosure’s informativeness for good-
versus-bad news corresponds directly to the definition of accounting conservatism found in
Gigler and Hemmer (1999), Bagnoli and Watts (2005), Chen et al. (2007), Suijs (2008), and
Bertomeu et al. (2016). Under this definition, conservatism leads to more frequent issuance
of bad news irrespective of the state and hence disclosure that is more informative for good
news than bad news. Other theoretical work uses different definitions of conservatism that
often have opposing predictions (see Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012) and Beyer (2013) for
insightful discussions of this issue). The model speaks only to the informativeness of disclo-
sure for good-versus-bad news; the precise mapping between this concept and conservatism
depends upon how one defines conservatism.6
5While voluntary disclosure equilibria are trivially unravelling in a two-state Verrecchia (1983) model,
general voluntary disclosure equilibria can be analyzed in the set up I consider in Section 1.5. The finding
that discretion in disclosure choices tends to lead to greater prices of OTM options relative to ITM options
continues to hold in that section.
6From an empirical perspective, this implies there is an ambiguity in how to map conservatism into
the measure I develop. However, as discussed in Ewert and Wagenhofer (2012), this is equally a concern
for conventional measures of conservatism such as the Basu measure. A higher value of η in my model
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Note that while I take the disclosure regime as exogenous, the model could be applied
to study endogenous disclosure equilibria (voluntary disclosure, disclosure bias, etc.). The
important property of these equilibria in affecting option prices is their impact on the distri-
bution of the post-disclosure equity price. For example, if the disclosure regime results from
a voluntary disclosure game, the results of the model could be applied to the endogenous
properties of the disclosure regime that arise in equilibrium.
1.2.1. Analysis
I begin by deriving the equilibrium equity and option prices. Since the investor is risk neu-
tral, the firm’s price at date t is simply the investor’s expectation of the terminal dividend.
Therefore, at date 0 the firm’s price is E [x̃] for any disclosure regime. At date 1 the firm’s
disclosure is public, such that the firm’s price is the investor’s expectation of x̃ given the
disclosure, E [x̃|ỹ]. Risk neutrality also implies that options are priced at their expected
payoffs; I focus on pre-disclosure option prices for reasons that I discuss at the end of this
section.




1−2η if ỹ = yH
(1−λ+η)xH+(λ+η)xL
1+2η if ỹ = yL.
(1.2)
The pre-disclosure prices of call and put options with strike price of k equal:
ΦC (k) = E [max (P1 (ỹ)− k, 0)] ; (1.3)
ΦP (k) = E [max (k − P1 (ỹ) , 0)] .
Note that the option price can be explicitly calculated by using the distribution of equity
prices that is implied by the lemma. With these results established, we may examine how
the disclosure regime impacts the prices of equities and options.
corresponds to a lower value of the Basu measure.
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Disclosure’s impact on equity prices
I first study the impact of the disclosure regime on equity prices in order to establish a
baseline of what may be learned by a researcher who observes equity prices alone.7 Note
that the disclosure’s properties have no impact on the pre-disclosure equity price because
it is priced at its ex-ante expected payoff E [x̃]. As this expected payoff is a fundamental
feature of the firm’s dividend, it is not changed by the properties of information that is
released about this dividend. The result suggests that pre-disclosure equity prices contain
no information regarding the properties of the disclosure.8
Although the disclosure’s properties do not affect pre-disclosure equity prices, they do affect
the distribution of equity returns on the disclosure date. Specifically, a more informative
disclosure increases the variance of returns on the disclosure date in proportion to xH −xL.
Note that xH − xL captures the investor’s uncertainty regarding the firm’s payoffs, since
V ar [x̃] ∝ (xH − xL)2. Thus, this result follows directly from Bayes’ rule, which suggests
that a more informative signal increases the variation in posterior beliefs in proportion to
prior uncertainty. Furthermore, disclosure that is more informative for good-versus-bad
news leads to greater positive skewness in returns. Such asymmetric disclosure causes the
market to place greater weight on the disclosure when it contains good news and less weight
on the disclosure when it contains bad news. This creates a distribution that exhibits more
variation conditional on its value exceeding its mean, which manifests as skewness. Note that
these findings are consistent with empirical studies that use firms’ return variances around
disclosures to measure their informativeness (e.g., Beaver (1968)) and return skewnesses
around disclosures to measure their conservatism (e.g., Givoly and Hayn (2000)).
7One might conjecture that in a two-state model, since options can be replicated by trading in an equity
and the risk-free asset, a researcher could acquire the same information from equity prices as they could
from option prices. Note this is not the case, since the weights required to replicate the option using the
stock and the risk-free asset are themselves a function of the disclosure’s properties, and thus, are unknown
to the researcher.
8While this result might seem fairly specific to the set up at hand, it in fact holds for any utility function
or distribution as long as there is a representative investor or investors are homogenous. Even when this is
not the case, the essential point is that since option prices with different strikes are differentially reflected
by future returns, observing these prices provides more information than observing equity prices alone.
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The following lemma formalizes these results, where “equity returns on the disclosure date”







Lemma 2 1) The properties of the disclosure regime have no impact on the pre-disclosure
equity price.
2) An increase in the disclosure’s informativeness increases the variance of equity returns
on the disclosure date in proportion to payoff uncertainty, xH − xL, and has no effect on
return skewness.
3) An increase in the disclosure’s informativeness for good-versus-bad news increases the
skewness of equity returns on the disclosure date.
Despite the fact that disclosure affects the distribution of equity returns on the disclosure
date, the amount of information a researcher can learn from equity prices is limited. The
reason is that a researcher does not directly observe this distribution but instead observes
only the equity returns induced by the realized disclosure report, ỹ, which translates into
a single observation from this distribution. In order to fully understand the disclosure’s
properties, one would have to observe the equity-price reaction to every possible outcome
of the disclosure, ỹ, an impossible task. Prior empirical literature addresses this issue by
estimating the distribution using multiple firm disclosures and appealing to the law-of-large
numbers (Beaver (1968), Givoly and Hayn (2000)), or by assuming that disclosure is equally
informative for any level of firm performance (the earnings-response coefficient literature).
The former approach requires the assumption that the properties of the firm’s disclosures
do not change over time and cannot be used for sporadic disclosures that are dissimilar from
other firm disclosures, such as 8-K’s, and reduces statistical power. The latter approach
rules out the possibility of asymmetric disclosure regimes.
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Disclosure’s impact on option prices
Next, I consider how the disclosure regime impacts option prices, demonstrating their incre-
mental information content. In my analysis, I focus on the pre-disclosure prices of options
that mature immediately after the disclosure; at the end of the subsection, I discuss why
the information in these prices is sufficient for the information in the prices of short- and
long- maturity options before and after the disclosure.
First, since more informative disclosure increases the variability in equity prices in pro-
portion to payoff uncertainty, xH − xL, it increases the pre-disclosure prices of all options
in proportion to xH − xL. Second, by creating skewness in equity returns, increasing the
informativeness of the disclosure for good-versus-bad news increases (decreases) the prices
of OTM call (put) options and decreases (increases) the prices of ITM call (put) options.
Intuitively, this skewness increases the probability of upper-tail equity returns. These ex-
treme returns increase the expected payoffs to OTM call options, which require an increase
in the equity price to pay off (the converse holds for put options). This effect is familiar
from the prior option-pricing literature that prices options as a function of exogenously
given equity-return moments (e.g., Bakshi et al. (2003), Christoffersen et al. (2006)). I
summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 1) An increase in the disclosure’s informativeness weakly increases the pre-
disclosure prices of options of all strikes and strictly increases equally the pre-disclosure
prices of options with strikes k ∈ (P1 (yL) , P1 (yH)). The size of this effect increases in
payoff uncertainty, xH − xL.
2) An increase in the disclosure’s informativeness for good-versus-bad news weakly increases
the pre-disclosure prices of OTM call (ITM put) options and weakly decreases the pre-
disclosure prices of ITM call (OTM put) options that mature just after the disclosure; the
relationships are strict for options with strikes k ∈ (P1 (yL) , P1 (yH)).
The proposition suggests that by examining option prices of different strikes, a researcher
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can determine both the overall informativeness of the disclosure and its informativeness for
good-versus-bad news. This is formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Observing pre-disclosure option prices reveals both the disclosure’s informa-
tiveness and its informativeness for good-versus-bad news, i.e., it reveals the parameters
(λ, η) given knowledge of xH − xL.
The proof shows how λ and η may theoretically be backed out from observed call option
prices. In Appendix A.1, I develop simple empirical measures for the parameters λ and η
that are robust to investor risk aversion and continuous trade. First, λ may be captured by
the price of an ATM option normalized by a measure of investor uncertainty such as equity-
price volatility or firm size. Intuitively, Proposition 1 states that λ increases the prices of
options of all strikes. Note, however, there are two hurdles in implementing this approach
empirically. First, the firm’s payoff uncertainty, xH − xL, determines the magnitude of the
effect that λ has on option prices; this can serve as an omitted variable in empirical analysis.
In Appendix A.1, I show that dividing by an estimate of xH −xL corrects for this potential
bias. The second hurdle is the fact that pre-disclosure option prices are also affected by the
extent to which they are ITM or OTM (i.e., P0 − k), in a nonlinear fashion that interacts
with xH − xL; by examining ATM options, this issue can be avoided.
Next, I show that η may be captured by the difference between the prices of a moderately
OTM and a moderately ITM call option divided by the difference in their strike prices,
controlling for the asymmetry of the firm’s cash flows and the measure of informativeness.
Note that choosing which ITM and OTM contracts to compare involves a trade-off. First,
the size of the effect detailed in Proposition 1 is larger for options that are further from
being ATM. However, options that are further from being ATM are typically less liquid;
this is especially true for deep ITM options, which, given that their returns resemble those
of equities, are infrequently traded.
Prior literature typically applies a very different approach to utilizing the information in
13
option prices. This literature calculates model-free implied return variances and skewnesses,
which capture the variance and skewness of the risk-neutral distribution, and associate
them with variables of interest (e.g., Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), Britten-Jones and
Neuberger (2000), Bakshi et al. (2003), Figlewski (2009)). As Lemma 2 suggests that
the disclosure’s informativeness and asymmetry manifest in return variance and skewness,
one might conjecture that these such measures could be used to capture the disclosure’s
properties. Indeed, these measures capture the disclosure’s properties when the disclosure
concerns idiosyncratic risk, as in the current section, since in this case the risk-neutral
distribution is the same as the true distribution. However, in Chapter 2, I show that this
approach entails several identification problems when the disclosure contains a systematic
component, which arises from the disconnect between the risk-neutral distribution and the
true return distribution.
To this point, I have considered only the pre-disclosure prices of options that expire soon
after the disclosure. Note that their post-disclosure prices cannot contain incremental in-
formation over the equity price, as they are simply a function of the equity price. However,
one may question whether the prices of options that mature further into the future might
also contain information regarding the disclosure’s properties. Thus, consider options that
mature at date 2; to ensure these options have value, assume the firm’s dividend is paid
after their expiration or that the options are dividend adjusted. The payoffs to long-horizon
call (put) options equal max (x̃− k, 0) (max (k − x̃, 0)). Applying the results from Breeden
and Litzenberger (1978), the post-disclosure prices of these options enable the derivation
of the conditional distribution of x̃ given the realized disclosure ỹ, f (x̃|ỹ). While this dis-
tribution contains more information regarding the disclosure’s properties than the realized
equity price, E [x̃|ỹ], it is still not sufficient to calculate the properties of the disclosure in
general. Therefore, an analysis of pre-disclosure short-horizon option prices alone is suffi-
cient to capture the information contained in option prices of all maturities both before and
after the disclosure.9
9I note that this is somewhat specific to the present set up. Post-disclosure option prices may be useful in
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1.3. Investor risk aversion and systematic disclosure
In this section, I extend the model to the case where the investor is risk averse with respect
to the outcome of the information disclosed by the firm. This corresponds to a disclosure
that concerns the outcome of a systematic event, which may represent a disclosure by a
large firm or a macro-forecast. To implement investor risk aversion into the model, I make
one modification to the assumptions in the prior section. Specifically, assume now that the
representative agent has a general risk-averse utility function u (·) as a function of their
wealth at time 2, satisfying u′ (·) > 0 and u′′ (·) ≤ 0. While the reader might express
concern that I model risk aversion and systematic risk in a model with only a single equity
security, I note that the results extend naturally to the case of many correlated equities.
The BSM model argues that investors’ risk preferences play no role in pricing an option
conditional on the present level of and distribution of equity prices, as option prices are
determined purely by the assumption of no-arbitrage. However, options can be priced
by no arbitrage only when the firm’s stock price follows a continuous process (see, e.g.,
Merton (1976)). As the disclosure in my model causes the equity price to jump, investors’
preferences must be considered in pricing options (note that the relationship between my
model and BSM will become more clear in the next section, in which I consider continuous
trade).
I find that in the presence of risk aversion, disclosure has a nuanced effect on option
prices because it both increases options’ expected payoffs and the riskiness of their pay-
offs. Nonetheless, Proposition 1 continues to hold, but the magnitude of the effects outlined
in the proposition depend upon the degree of the investor’s risk aversion. To begin, again
consider how the disclosure impacts equity prices.
Lemma 3 The firm’s pre-disclosure stock price P0 equals E [u
′ (x̃)]−1E [x̃u′ (x̃)] and the
firm’s post-disclosure stock price P1 (ỹ) equals E [u
′ (x̃) |ỹ]−1E [x̃u′ (x̃) |ỹ]. Consequently,
examining other properties of the disclosure that I do not consider here, such as its informativeness regarding
the firm’s risk.
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1) The firm’s ex-ante and ex-post equity prices include risk premia.
2) The ex-ante equity price is unaffected by the disclosure.
3) The expected post-disclosure equity price, E [P1 (ỹ)], increases in the informativeness of
the disclosure.
4) Observing pre- and post- disclosure equity prices (P0, P1 (ỹ)) is insufficient to learn the
disclosure’s properties λ and η.
The equity is priced using the standard asset-pricing Euler equation, and thus equals the sum
of the equity’s payoff in each state of the world multiplied by the representative investor’s
marginal utility in that state. This price exhibits three intuitive features that are important
in pricing options. First, it exhibits a risk premium, that is, P0 and P1 (ỹ) fall short of the
market’s expectations of terminal value at the respective dates, E [x̃] and E [x̃|ỹ], implying
that the firm’s expected returns exceed the risk-free rate. Second, the ex-ante (date 0)
equity price is unaffected by the disclosure and its properties, λ and η. This result mirrors
the findings of Ross (1989) and Christensen et al. (2010) and is directly assumed in Patell
and Wolfson (1979, 1981). Finally, the size of the post-disclosure risk premium decreases
as the firm releases a more informative disclosure, consistent with the findings in Lambert,
Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007). Intuitively, disclosure reduces uncertainty, which in turn
reduces the investor’s effective risk aversion. Again, equity prices are insufficient to learn
the disclosure’s properties, λ and η, because the researcher only observes the equity response
associated with the realized disclosure ỹ and because the ex-ante equity price is independent
of λ and η.
Next, consider disclosure’s effect on pre-disclosure option prices.
Proposition 2 The pre-disclosure prices of call and put options with strike
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k ∈ (P1 (yL) , P1 (yH)) that expire just after the disclosure equal:
ΦC (k) =








1) Investor risk aversion decreases (increases) the pre-disclosure prices of call (put) options
of all strikes.
2) An increase in the disclosure’s informativeness weakly increases the pre-disclosure prices
of options of all strikes and strictly increases the pre-disclosure prices of options with strikes
k ∈ (P1 (yL) , P1 (yH)). The size of this effect increases in payoff uncertainty, xH − xL.
3) An increase in the disclosure’s informativeness for good-versus-bad news increases the
pre-disclosure prices of OTM call (ITM put) options and decreases the pre-disclosure prices
of ITM call (OTM put) options.
4) Conditional on knowledge of the investor’s utility function u (·), pre-disclosure option
prices reveal the disclosure’s properties, λ and η.
As with the equity price, the equilibrium option price follows from the Euler equation
and equals the sum of the option’s payoff in each state of the world multiplied by the
representative investor’s marginal utility of wealth in that state. As the investor’s wealth
at the end of the model stems from the firm’s dividend and call (put) options’ payoffs are
positively (negatively) correlated with this dividend, the price of these options include a
positive (negative) risk premium.
The next part of the proposition concerns the robustness of results in the prior section to
investor risk aversion. Note that when the investor is risk averse, the disclosure’s infor-
mativeness has three effects on option prices; I refer to these effects as the expected-payoff
effect, the option-risk effect, and the cost-of-capital effect. I provide the intuition under-
lying these effects for call options. First, the expected-payoff effect carries over from the
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risk-neutral analysis conducted in Lemma 2: more informative disclosure affects options’
expected payoffs by increasing the variance of the equity price. However, this increase in
variance also increases the riskiness of the options payoff, which I term the option-risk effect.
For instance, if an option is ITM prior to a disclosure event, it is possible that price falls in
response to the disclosure, leading the option to expire OTM. Importantly, this risk is priced
by the investor, pushing down the option’s pre-disclosure price. Finally, the fact that more
informative disclosure reduces the equity risk premium after its release tends to increase
call options’ expected payoffs, pushing up their prices; I refer to this as the cost-of-capital
effect. Part 2 of the proposition states that the expected-payoff and cost-of-capital effects
dominate the option-risk effect: more informative disclosure continues to increase option
prices.
An increase in the disclosure’s asymmetry also impacts option prices through the expected-
payoff, option-risk, and cost-of-capital effects. As in the risk-neutral case studied in the
prior section, the expected-payoff effect is positive for OTM call options and negative for
ITM call options. Furthermore, asymmetry in the disclosure causes options to be more
likely to pay off when the underlying state is high; that is, loosely speaking, it increases
call options’ betas, which drives their prices downward. Finally, asymmetric disclosure can
impact the firm’s cost of capital, but the direction of this effect is not signable in general,
and depends upon the precise shape of the investor’s preferences. Nonetheless, the net
effect of an increase in the disclosure’s informativeness for good-versus-bad news remains
positive for OTM options and negative for ITM options. Again, option prices reveal the
parameters λ and η conditional on knowledge of u (·). In Appendix A.1, I show that from
an empirical point of view, the qualifier that knowledge of u (·) is required to back out λ
and η generally does not represent a problem to estimation if the investors holding different
firms have similar preferences.
I next show that the magnitude of the effect disclosure has on option prices depends upon
investor risk aversion. Define an increase in investor risk aversion as a concavification of
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the utility function: u1 is more risk averse than u2 if and only if there exists an increasing,
concave function g such that u1 = g (u2).
10
Corollary 2 1) An increase in investor risk aversion magnifies (attenuates) the effect of the
disclosure’s informativeness on the pre-disclosure prices of call options with strikes k > E [x̃]
(k < E [x̃]).
2) An increase in investor risk aversion causes the disclosure’s informativeness for good-
versus-bad news to have a more positive impact on all pre-disclosure option prices.
The corollary provides testable predictions on how the extent of systematic versus idiosyn-
cratic information contained in a disclosure moderates how it influences option prices. The
intuition underlying the first part of the corollary for call options is as follows. An increase
in risk aversion amplifies the negative option-risk and positive cost-of-capital effects that the
disclosure’s informativeness has on option prices. However, the relative size of these effects
depends on an option’s strike. Specifically, the (positive) cost-of-capital effect is similar for
call options of differing strikes; it simply pushes up the equity price, increasing options’
ex-post payoffs. On the other hand, the (negative) option-risk effect has a greater impact
on low-strike than high-strike call options, as investors holding ITM options have ”more
to lose” from a downswing in the equity price. The second part of the corollary follows
because risk aversion amplifies the effect that η has on the equity price when call options
pay off, P (yH). The reason is that η reduces the probability that a high signal results from
poor performance, and thus decreases the investor’s uncertainty given yH .
1.4. Continuous-time formulation
The model developed to this point may be criticized on the grounds that its results are
difficult to compare to conventional option-pricing models in which investors trade contin-
uously and the firm’s stock price evolves according to a diffusion process. In this section, I
demonstrate that the results in the prior section continue to hold in such a setting. Specif-
10See Pratt (1964) and Gollier (2004) for the development of this notion.
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ically, assume now that the investor trades the bond, stock, and options continuously over
a period [0, T ]. The final period T corresponds to time 2 in the discrete-time model: it is
the time at which the firm pays off x̃ to its equity holders. I now assume that x̃ can be
decomposed into two independent subcomponents, one that the firm discloses about, õ, and
one related to other information released by external sources, d̃:
x̃ = õ+ d̃. (1.5)
I choose to include this second component of cash flows, õ, in the model in order to allow
the firm’s price to evolve continuously for reasons unrelated to the disclosure event. Its
presence leads to a price process similar to the one found in the BSM and related option-
pricing models. The results in this section continue to hold in the absence of this term, or
if this term is correlated with d̃. At date 0, the investor has a prior that õ has a log-normal
distribution with parameters µ0 and σ
2
0 > 0. The investor receives information continuously
regarding õ, which captures information that is gradually embedded into the firm’s price.
This may stem from forces such as information processing or private information gathering.
In particular, assume that the posterior beliefs of the investor regarding õ evolve according











where Bt is a Brownian motion. Intuitively, these belief dynamics capture the limit of a
discrete-time model in which investors receive normally-distributed signals regarding log õ in
each of many time periods, as the time between each period and the precision of each signal






T dt = 0, at
the final date T , investors know õ, i.e., eµT = õ.11 Note that while I make rather specific
11Note that this type of framework is standard in the continuous-time asset pricing literature; see, e.g.,
Naik and Lee (1990), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006).
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assumptions on the stochastic process followed by the investor’s beliefs regarding õ, as I
discuss at the end of the section, the results are highly robust to various assumptions on
this process.
Next, assume that d̃ has the same distribution as the dividend in Section 1.2: d̃ = xH with
probability 12 and d̃ = xL with probability
1
2 . Assume that the firm releases a disclosure
ỹ regarding d̃ at date τD ∈ (0, T ) that has the same conditional distribution as in Section
1.2. Finally, assume that ỹ is independent of õ and Et [õ], ∀t ∈ (0, T ).
Denote a call (put) option’s price at time t as a function of the current stock price Pt, the
option’s maturity date τM and strike price k as Φ
C
t (Pt, k, τM ) (Φ
P
t (Pt, k, τM )). Applying
Bayes’ rule to determine the representative investor’s beliefs at each time point, solving her
optimization problem, and substituting the market-clearing condition yields the following
lemma:






The call and put option prices are equal to:
ΦCt (Pt, k, τM ) =
Et [max (PτM − k, 0)u′ (x̃)]
Et [u′ (x̃)]
; (1.8)
ΦPt (Pt, k, τM ) =
Et [max (k − PτM , 0)u′ (x̃)]
Et [u′ (x̃)]
.
The equity and option prices are continuous during the non-disclosure windows [0, τD) and
(τD, T ], and jump on the disclosure date τD.
The lemma states that the firm’s equity and option prices continue to be valued using the
conventional Euler equation in the continuous-trade framework. These prices evolve contin-
uously in the non-disclosure windows as investors continuously receive information about
the terminal dividend and jump on the date of the disclosure. Figure 2 plots a numerical
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Figure 2: This figure was generated by simulating pre- and post- disclosure equity and call
option prices, given binary d̃ ∈ {−1, 1} and a symmetric disclosure that perfectly recognizes
the true d̃. In the example, disclosure occurs at day 10, and the option matures at day 20.
example of pre- and post- disclosure equity and option prices under the assumption that
λ = 1 and η = 0. Notice that the equity and option prices evolve continuously prior to the
date of the disclosure, T = 10, at which point they jump up or down depending upon the
news provided in the disclosure. After the disclosure, they again evolve continuously until
the dividend is paid at date T = 20.
I next show that the effects of disclosure on equity and option prices highlighted in Lemma
2 and Proposition 1 continue to hold in the continuous-trade setting. In order to state this
formally, let the “pre-disclosure equity price” refer to limt→τ−D
Pt and the “pre-disclosure call
(put) option price” refer to limt→τ−D
ΦCt (Pt, k, τM ) (limt→τ−D
ΦPt (Pt, k, τM )). Furthermore,
refer to the “equity returns at the disclosure date” as the change in the firm’s equity price
induced by the disclosure, PτD − limt→τ−D Pt. Given these definitions, the statements in
Lemma 3, Proposition 1, and Corollary 2 apply directly to the continuous-trade setting.
Proposition 3 Results 1-4 in Proposition 2 continue to hold in the continuous-trade frame-
work for options that mature just after the disclosure (at date τD). Results 1-2 in Corollary
2 also continue to hold in the continuous-trade framework for these options if u (·) exhibits
non-increasing absolute risk aversion.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: in the continuous-trade setting, the dis-
22
Figure 3: This figure compares pre-disclosure option prices under a fully informative disclo-
sure (λ = 1, η = 0) and a completely uninformative disclosure
(
λ = 12 , η = 0
)
. The left-hand
plot depicts an ATM call option’s price as a function of xH − xL under the two policies.
The right-hand plot depicts call options’ prices as a function of their strike under the two
policies
closure’s properties affect the jump in price on the disclosure date in the same manner in
which they affect the change in price from date 0 to date 1 in discrete-trade setting. A
slight complexity arises because õ serves as a source of background risk that can modify the
representative investor’s risk preferences. This does not affect the results in Proposition 2,
since it holds for any parameterization of investor risk aversion. However, for the compar-
ative statics results articulated in Corollary 2 to continue to hold in the presence of this
background risk, a technical, albeit reasonable condition must hold: the investor must have
non-increasing absolute risk aversion. Figure 3 presents comparative statics on the effect of
disclosure’s informativeness on call option prices, taking the extreme approach of compar-
ing a fully informative disclosure (λ = 1, η = 0) to the case of completely noisy disclosure(
λ = 12 , η = 0
)
. The left figure demonstrates that the effect of disclosure on option prices
increases in uncertainty over d̃, xH − xL. The right figure plots the effect of disclosure on
an option’s price against the option’s strike.
Figure 4 depicts the impact of asymmetric informativeness on call option prices, comparing
the case in which the disclosure is more informative for good than bad news (λ = 0.7, η = 0.1)
to the case in which the disclosure is symmetric (λ = 0.7, η = 0). The upper plot demon-
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Figure 4: This figure depicts pre-disclosure call option prices under the regimes
(λ = 0.7, η = 0.1) and (λ = 0.7, η = 0) the former is represented by the dashed lines and
the latter by the solid lines. The upper plot depicts call options’ prices as a function of
their strike; the lower-left plot depicts the price of an ITM call option as a function of
xH − xL; the lower-right hand plot depicts the price an OTM call option as a function of
xH − xL.
strates that the effect of asymmetric informativeness on the price of an option depends on
whether the option is OTM or ITM; the pre-disclosure stock price in the figure equals 1,
the point at which the two price lines cross. The lower-left plot demonstrates the effect
on an ITM call option, while the lower-right plot demonstrates the effect on an OTM call
option, as a function of uncertainty regarding d̃. Intuitively, greater uncertainty magnifies
the response to disclosure and hence amplifies how asymmetric disclosure affects the relative
prices of OTM and ITM options.
Many option-pricing models allow for greater generality in the stochastic process followed by
the firm’s equity than the one that endogenously arises in this section. For instance, several
models allow the volatility of price to depend upon time and/or the present equity price or
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to possess a stochastic component (Hull and White (1987), Heston (1993), Dupire (1997)).
Moreover, models allow for exogenous jumps in the stock price with varying distributions
(Kou (2002)). Since in my framework the terminal dividend is taken as the exogenous
construct, to be included in the model, these features of the stock-price process would have
to arise endogenously from changes in the market’s beliefs. For instance, stochastic volatility
could arise due to uncertainty over the amount of information to arrive regarding õ. Jumps
in the stock price at times other than τD may arise due to information releases other than
the disclosure, large investors’ liquidity shocks, etc. Time- and price- dependent volatility
might arise if the market’s incentives to acquire information depend upon their wealth or
otherwise dynamically change (Vanden (2008)).
Nonetheless, the introduction of these additional features would have no qualitative impact
on my results. The reason is that, subject to minor regularity conditions, the proof of
Proposition 3 does not depend upon the stochastic process followed by the stock price in
the periods [0, τD) and (τD, T ]. Intuitively, the proposition concerns the prices of options
just prior to the disclosure that expire soon after the disclosure. The dynamics of price
in non-disclosure periods only impact these options’ prices through introducing a source of
background risk in the representative investor’s consumption. But, since the proposition
holds for any risk-averse investor preference function, and since introducing background risk
preserves risk aversion (Gollier 2004), the results are robust to the price dynamics in the
non-disclosure windows.
1.5. Generalized information structures
In this section, I generalize the binary information structure in the previous section in order
to demonstrate that my focal results are applicable to a broad range of settings found in the
prior theoretical-disclosure literature. The approach I take is to allow for full generality in
the distribution of the firm’s payoff and the conditional distribution of the firm’s disclosure
given this payoff. I then characterize properties of the disclosure that are both necessary
and sufficient for the results in Proposition 1 to hold, which capture general conceptions
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of the disclosure’s informativeness and asymmetry in an intuitive matter. Finally, in the
Internet Appendix, I show that these conditions are met in several settings studied in prior
disclosure literature.
Suppose now that the representative investor is risk-neutral.12 Let d̃ now follow an arbitrary
distribution satisfying E
[∣∣∣d̃∣∣∣] <∞ that possesses a CDF Fd̃(·) with support [dL, dH ] where
dL ∈ [−∞, dH) and dH ∈ (dL,∞].13 Moreover, suppose the disclosure ỹ, which takes values
in Υ, has an arbitrary statistical relationship with d̃. Denote the CDF of ỹ given d̃ as Fỹ|d̃ (·)
and assume that E
[∣∣∣d̃|ỹ = z∣∣∣] < ∞ ∀z ∈ Υ. I now refer to a disclosure regime Ri as a
distribution function of ỹ given d̃.
The general notions of a disclosure’s informativeness and asymmetry definitions that I de-
velop are based on the fact that the disclosure impacts the equity price through its effect
on the investor’s posterior expectation of d̃, ξ̃Ri . An uninformative disclosure regime rarely














, to change substantially based upon the information contained in
the disclosure. Generalizing this idea, a disclosure regime can be considered more infor-
mative than another if it leads to more variation in the investor’s posterior expectations.
Thus, consider the following definition of informativeness, which makes this idea precise by
appealing to the concept of second-order stochastic dominance.




denote the posterior expectation of d̃ under a disclosure
regime Ri. A disclosure regime R2 is higher quality than a disclosure regime R1 if and only








(z) dz, that is, ξ̃R1 second-order stochastic dominates
12Note that the effect of disclosure on security prices when both payoff distributions and investor utility
are fully general is a difficult question even in the absence of a derivative (Gollier and Schlee (2011)). Thus,
tractably analyzing more general distributions requires a simpler assumption on investor preferences. The
results in this section are most applicable to idiosyncratic disclosure.
13Generally, in the applications, it makes sense to restrict dL to be nonnegative, such that the firm’s share
price is nonnegative. However, in demonstrating how definitions of conservatism in prior literature that





Importantly, this definition is both necessary and sufficient for Part 1 of Proposition 1 to
hold.
Proposition 4 A disclosure regime R2 is more informative than a disclosure regime R1 if
and only if the pre-disclosure prices of options of all strike prices are higher under R2 than
R1.
In the Internet Appendix, I demonstrate that several conventional definitions of disclosure
informativeness found in the literature (including the one used in the previous sections)
indeed rank disclosure regimes according to Definition 1, suggesting that for a fairly large set
of distributions, my results continue to hold. However, note that some disclosure policies are
not capable of being ranked using this definition of informativeness. For instance, consider
two disclosure regimes: the first is a setting of voluntary disclosure studied by Verrecchia
(1983) whereby a firm discloses d̃ whenever it lies above some threshold TV , and refrains
from disclosing d̃ whenever it falls below TV . Conversely, consider the conservative disclosure
regime studied by Guay and Verrecchia (2006) whereby a firm discloses d̃ whenever it falls
below the threshold TC and refrains from disclosing whenever it lies above TC . Then, for
any pair of thresholds (TC , TV ), it can be shown that these disclosure regimes cannot be
ranked based on this definition.
An implication of this result is that even if the voluntary disclosure regime perfectly reveals
the firm’s performance to investors except in the case of a highly unlikely large loss, and the
conservative regime reveals only highly extreme, very unlikely losses, the regimes still cannot
be ranked based on informativeness. Moreover, because the definition is both necessary and
sufficient to increase the prices of options of all strikes, this implies that the conservative
regime increases the price of some options relative to the voluntary regime, even when it
on average reveals much less information (specifically, deep ITM options). The takeaway








is fixed at the prior mean, E (η̃). As
a result, an equivalent definition is that ξ̃∆2 is a mean-preserving spread of ξ̃∆1 .
27
is that empirical tests may indeed use the prices of options to compare the informativeness
of two disclosure regimes, but only if option prices of all traded strikes are greater under
one regime than under the other (controlling for the present stock price and investors’ prior
uncertainty).15
Next, consider a general notion of disclosure’s asymmetry, which is an extension of the
previous definition.
Definition 2 A disclosure regime R2 is more informative for good-versus-bad news than a


























The definition extends the previous one in the sense that a disclosure policy may be called
more informative for good-versus-bad news when it leads to more variation in the investor’s




), and less variation




). Also in the Internet
Appendix, I demonstrate how several conventional definitions of conservative and aggressive
disclosure found in the literature map into this criterion including the one used in the
previous sections. Given this definition, Part 2 of Proposition 1 extends naturally to the
case of a general distribution, and again, it is in fact both a necessary and sufficient condition
for the result to hold.
Proposition 5 A disclosure regime R2 is more informative for good-versus-bad news than
disclosure regime R1 if and only if:
1) The pre-disclosure prices of OTM call (put) options that mature at time τD are higher
(lower) under R2 than R1, and
2) the pre-disclosure prices of ITM call (put) options that mature at time τD are higher
(lower) under R1 than R2.
15Note this condition may be violated due to liquidity reasons absent from the model, even when the
disclosure is in fact more informative.
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1.6. Multiple investors with heterogenous beliefs
While the model is framed in terms of a representative investor, in reality, there are many
investors trading in firms’ options that likely have heterogenous information and beliefs. In
this case, I demonstrate that option prices reveal a weighted average of investors’ beliefs
about the properties of the disclosure. In particular, suppose that there exists a continuum
[0, 1] of competitive risk-averse investors again with arbitrary utility function u (·). Their
beliefs are heterogenous in the sense that the ith investor perceives the CDF’s of d̃, ỹ|d̃, and





õ, respectively. In order to rule out the case in which an investor
wishes to buy or sell an infinite amount of an asset, suppose that the investors’ beliefs are
mutually absolutely continuous. Then, the following result establishes that this extension is
equivalent to the case in which there is a representative investor with some risk-averse utility
function and an average of the individual investors’ beliefs. As a result, the directional effect
of the results considered in the previous sections remain unchanged.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium equity and option prices in a model with heterogenous in-
vestors is equivalent to one in which there is a single risk-averse representative investor with
beliefs equal to the average market belief.
This result suggests that even if only a subset of investors in the market understand the
properties of an upcoming disclosure, their beliefs will be impounded into prices. Thus,
option prices may still be used to measure a disclosure’s properties.
1.7. Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze an option-pricing model that formally incorporates an anticipated
disclosure event. I demonstrate how the disclosure’s informativeness and asymmetry affect
option prices prior to its release. The model suggests that the disclosure’s properties are
an important determinant of options’ expected payoffs, suggesting that a knowledge of
accounting systems can lead to more efficient pricing of option contracts. Moreover, my
results suggest that in an efficient market, option prices can serve as a useful measure of
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investor’s beliefs regarding an upcoming disclosure’s properties. The measures developed
can be calculated on a disclosure-event basis, obviating the need for strong assumptions
underlying prior empirical measures.
In part, the paper’s contribution is to build a rigorous, yet tractable, framework in which
the effect of a disclosure on option prices may be analyzed. While the present paper focuses
on only two properties of a disclosure, it may also be interesting to study how other features
of a disclosure, such as bias, persistence, smoothness, etc., manifest in option prices. The
model also takes the statistical properties of the disclosure as exogenous in order to maintain
a focus on how these properties affect option prices. Another extension of the model would
endogenize the disclosure to be made by a decision maker, such as a manager, who cares
both about equity and option prices, in order to show how features such as proprietary
costs or information uncertainty might be backed out from option prices.
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CHAPTER 2 : Option Prices and Disclosure: Additional Analyses
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I perform additional analyses of the material presented in Chapter 1. To
begin, I examine patterns in option prices in a static and dynamic models of voluntary dis-
closure. Next, I extend the empirical measures of informativeness and asymmetry developed
in the appendix to Chapter 1 to the case in which the firm’s fundamentals are asymmetric.
Then, I show that standard measures of implied volatility and skewness cannot be used
to measure a disclosure’s informativeness and asymmetry independently. Finally, I demon-
strate that the definitions of informativeness and asymmetry I use in Section 5 are satisfied
in a wide array of settings found in prior models of disclosure.
2.2. Static voluntary disclosure and option prices
In Chapter 1, I studied the impact of a disclosure’s properties on option prices while tak-
ing these properties as a given, and found that one can measure these properties using
option prices. However, in many cases, one might be interested the underlying drivers of
a disclosure’s properties, rather than the disclosure’s properties themselves. For instance,
a researcher may wish to measure the cost to biasing a financial disclosure, features of a
firm’s competitive environment, the rate at which information reaches the firm, or the cost
to releasing a discretionary disclosure. As a general fact, one can measure these drivers
using option prices under the condition that there exists a one-to-one mapping between
the driver of interest and the disclosure’s properties outlined in Chapter 1. The process is
as follows: first, measure the disclosure’s properties, and next, determine what the driver
of the disclosure must have been in order to lead to these properties. In this section, I
demonstrate this in the context of a specific type of disclosure – voluntary disclosure –
whose determinants have been extensively studied in prior theoretical literature. I show
that option prices enable the measurement of a key driver of disclosure – its cost.
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2.2.1. Set up
Suppose that the firm is run by a manager who knows the firm’s value x̃ and can cred-
ibly disclose this information to the market at a cost of c. For simplicity, assume that
the manager is compensated exclusively via equity and thus acts to maximize the firm’s
stock price. I assume that x̃ has a continuous log-concave distribution, and that either
limT→−∞ [T − E (x̃|x̃ < T )] = 0 or that x̃ is bounded below; these assumptions ensure
equilibrium existence and uniqueness and hold for a wide array of well-known distribu-
tions including the normal distribution. Assume that market prices are set by risk-neutral
investors.
As in Section 2 of Chapter 1, I assume there are three discrete dates: pre-disclosure, post-
disclosure, and the payoff date. In particular, assume that investors know the manager has
information and might disclose their information on a specific date, which I refer to as date
1. As in Chapter 1, let P0 denote the price prior to the possibility of disclosure and P1
the price following the possibility of disclosure; note that I use the phrase “possibility of
disclosure” given that the manager may choose not to disclose their information. At a final
date 2, the firm pays off its value to its equityholders.
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium played in the voluntary disclosure game,
which is standard (see, e.g., Verrecchia (1983) and Bagnoli and Watts (2007)): the manager
discloses news that exceeds a threshold, but does not disclose news that falls short of this
threshold.
Lemma 5 There exists a unique equilibrium in which the manager discloses x̃ when x̃ >
T (c) and refrains from disclosing otherwise. In this equilibrium,
1) The disclosure threshold T (c) is differentiable and increasing in c;
2) The firm’s pre-disclosure price, P0, equals E (x̃)− c (1− Fx (T (c)));
3) The firm’s post-disclosure price P1 in the absence of disclosure equals E (x̃|x̃ < T (c))
and in the presence of disclosure equals x̃− c.
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Using this lemma, I next derive the firm’s option prices prior to the disclosure, as in Chapter
1.
2.2.2. Option prices
In order to derive pre-disclosure option prices, consider first the distribution of the post-
disclosure equity price, P1. Using Lemma 5, we have:
FP1 (z) =
 0 if z < E (x̃|x̃ < T (c))Fx (z + c) if z ≥ E (x̃|x̃ < T (c)) .
 . (2.1)
Intuitively, there exists a large mass point in the distribution of P1 at the price associated
with nondisclosure, E (x̃|x̃ < T (c)). This creates a discontinuity in the CDF of P1, jumping
from 0 to Fx (T (c)) at the point E (x̃|x̃ < T (c)). Above the point at which the manager
begins disclosing, the distribution of price is simply equal to the distribution of the firm’s
fundamental value, shifted by the disclosure cost. Using this result, we can derive pre-
disclosure call option prices; put option prices are derived similarly.
Proposition 7 The pre-disclosure price of a call option with strike k is equal to:
ΦC0 (k) =
 E (x̃)− c (1− Fx (T (c)))− k if k < E (x̃|x̃ < T (c))(1− Fx (k + c)) (E (x̃|x̃ > k + c)− c− k) if k ≥ E (x̃|x̃ < T (c)) .
 (2.2)
The proposition is depicted in figure 5 below, which shows the price of a call option as a
function of its strike. The option price function is non-differentiable precisely at the point
at which the option’s strike is equal to the firm’s price given nondisclosure. The reason
is that, for strikes below this point, the option always expires in the money. Hence, a
one dollar increase in the option’s strike corresponds to a one dollar decrease in its payoff.
In equilibrium, the price associated with nondisclosure is exactly the same as the price
that arises when the manager receives the weakest signal that induces them to disclose.
Thus, just above the price associated with nondisclosure, the option expires in the money
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Figure 5: This figure depicts option prices in the static voluntary disclosure game as a
function of strike.
only when the manager discloses x̃ − c ≥ k, which occurs with probability 1 − Fx (k + c).
Thus, a one dollar increase in the option’s strike reduces its value by 1− Fx (k + c). Using
these results, I next consider the empirical identification of the disclosure cost c using
pre-disclosure option prices. Prior work studies the identification of c using equity prices
and/or the frequency of disclosure events (Bertomeu, Beyer, and Taylor (2016), Bertomeu,
Ma, and Marinovic (2016)). This approach requires a large cross-section and/or time-series
of disclosure events, since we cannot observe the theoretical threshold level of performance
T (c) below which the firm refrains from disclosure by observing only one disclosure event.
In contrast, the approach I discuss here can be used on an event-specific basis, which reduces
the assumptions necessary to ensure that the measure is well identified.
In theory, we could identify T (c) by searching for the point of non-differentiability in ob-
served option prices as a function of their strike; according to Proposition 7, this point pre-
cisely equals T (c).16 Given the fact that T is monotonic, we could then invert c from T (c).
In practice, this is obviously impossible for a multitude of reasons. For instance, investors
only trade in a finite variety of options. Moreover, for the point of non-differentiability to
exist, it is necessary that investors perfectly anticipate the firm’s price in the absence of a
16If there are discontinuities in Fx, we will find multiple points of non-differentiability in the option-price
function. In this case, we would look for the first point of non-differentiability to identify T (c).
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disclosure as well as the probability of disclosure, which seems incredibly unlikely.
There is a much more reasonable approach to identify c when we place an assumption
regarding the distribution of x̃. To demonstrate this in perhaps the simplest possible case,
assume that x̃ = µ + σz̃ where z̃ ∼ U [−1, 1]. Solving for T (c) using the equilibrium












if k ≥ µ− σ + c.
 (2.3)
Assume that c < σ, which implies that managers disclose their information with non-zero











































Now, we may estimate
∂ΦC0 (k)
∂k by using the slope of the prices of two option contracts that
are close to being ATM,
ΦC0 (k2)−ΦC0 (k1)
















for k2 > P0 > k1. Note that
c
σ measures “normalized” proprietary costs, as in Bertomeu,
Beyer, and Taylor (2016). cσ is normalized in the sense that it approximately corrects for
variation in c that arises from changes in the firm’s size. Large firms naturally should have
greater proprietary costs in total, but perhaps not per dollar of invested capital; division
by σ corrects for this fact given that volatility also scales linearly in size. However, the
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measure is not perfect: variation in σ not driven by firm size may create noise. This might
be ameliorated by multiplying the measure by an estimate of a firm’s fundamental volatility
and controlling for the firm’s size.
2.3. Dynamic voluntary disclosure and option prices
I next consider option prices in a dynamic voluntary disclosure setting. In this setting,
the time at which the firm’s manager receives information is uncertain to investors, which
enables her to “hide” bad news even in the absence of a disclosure cost (Acharya, DeMarzo,
and Kremer (2011)). Consequently, when valuing options, investors have to consider both
whether the manager will have received news by the option’s maturity date and whether
the manager will strategically withhold that news conditional on receiving it. My main
finding is that, by looking at a specific ratio of the prices of different option contracts, a
researcher can measure how rapidly the manager observes information, corresponding to
the timeliness of voluntary disclosure.
2.3.1. Set up
Suppose that the firm’s value has an arbitrary distribution x̃, but that the manager does
not learn the firm’s value until a stochastic date τ̃A with continuous distribution FτA (·)
possessing full support on [0,∞). Further, suppose that upon learning x̃, the manager may
truthfully disclose their information immediately, or delay disclosing this information to
any point in the future (or never at all). I assume that the manager acts to maximize a
discounted sum of prices,
∫∞
0 e
−δttPtdt, where δt ∈ [0,∞); this simply represents the fact
that the manager wants the firm’s price to be as high as possible at all times. Again,
assume that prices are set by risk-neutral investors. Without loss of generality, assume that
a manager who is indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing chooses to disclose.
As an example of a setting that fits these assumptions, consider a firm that undertakes an
pharmaceutical trial. The success or failure of such a trial is likely not known until a date
in the future; the precise date is likely unknown, given that there may be various delays in
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data collection and analysis. When the manager does eventually learn the trial’s outcome,
the manager may not be bound to immediately and publicly disclosing this outcome. Thus,
in the case of a failure, they may prefer to push the disclosure off, as such a disclosure would
suppress the firm’s stock price.
The next lemma characterizes the unique equilibrium in the model. As is typical in volun-
tary disclosure equilibria, the firm discloses only if its value exceeds some threshold. The
new feature that arises in the dynamic formulation of the game is that this threshold de-
clines over time. The reason is that as time passes, it becomes increasingly likely that the
manager in fact has learned the firm’s value. As investors know that the manager discloses
sufficiently good news when they receive it, this implies that the absence of disclosure is
increasingly likely to reflect bad news. Therefore, the price given nondisclosure falls, which
in turn makes the manager inclined to disclose even weaker information. Let PNDt denote
the firm’s equity price given that the manager has not disclosed information by time t.
Lemma 6 In the unique equilibrium, there exists a disclosure threshold h (t) such that the
manager who has learned the firm’s value discloses this value when x̃ > h (t) and delays
disclosure otherwise. In this equilibrium:
1) the disclosure threshold h (t) satisfies h (t) < E (x̃) and ∂h(t)∂t < 0;
2) the firm’s equity price in the case of nondisclosure, PNDt , is less than E (x̃) and declines
over time.
Figure 6 demonstrates examples of the process followed by the firm’s equity price that may
arise in equilibrium. The firm’s price falls until the manager discloses. On the date of
disclosure, price may either remain constant or jump up; whether there is a jump depends
upon whether the manager has just received information that exceeds price and discloses
it immediately, or whether they received information in the past, and have delayed the
disclosure of that information. If the manager has just received positive information that
exceeds price, they will disclose it immediately leading to a jump. On the other hand, if
they received information in the past, they were waiting for price to reach firm value. At
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Figure 6: Equity prices over time. In the left-hand figure, the manager delays disclosure
and price is continuous over time. In the right-hand figure, the manager learns information
that exceeds the equity price and discloses this information immediately, leading to a jump
in the price.
this point they disclose, causing price to remain constant. With the equilibrium established,
I next consider option prices at date 0.
2.3.2. Option prices
Consider the price of a call option with strike k as of time 0 that matures at date τM ,
which I refer to as ΦC0 (k, τM ). Options whose strikes lie below the nondisclosure equity
price at their maturity (k < PNDτM ) always pay off, independent of whether the firm discloses
or not. The reason is that the firm never discloses news that leads to a price worse than
the nondisclosure equity price. Thus, these options simply have a value of E (x̃) − k. On
the other hand, options whose strikes lie above the nondisclosure equity price pay off only
when the firm discloses news that pushes these options in the money. For this to occur, the
firm must both learn the firm’s value prior to these option’s maturity, and this value must
exceed the option’s strike. The next proposition formalizes the value of these options.
Proposition 8 The price of a call option with strike k and maturity τM satisfies:
ΦC0 (k, τM ) =
 E (x̃)− k if k < P
ND
τM
FτA (τM ) (1− Fx (h (τM ))) (E (x̃|x̃ > h (τM ))− k) if k ≥ PNDτM
 . (2.7)
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A corollary of this proposition is when the manager receives information more quickly, i.e.,
when FτA (τM ) tends to be lower (for instance, when τ̃A undergoes a shift in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance), options with strikes k ≥ PNDτM have greater prices. Since
PNDτM < E (x̃) , this includes ATM options and all OTM options. This result suggests that
one might measure the timeliness of the manager’s disclosure with the price of an OTM
option at some point prior to the disclosure’s release (which is observable ex post to a
researcher). However, an issue with this approach is that the price of such an option is also
a function of the features of the firm’s fundamentals. Notably, this includes the firm’s size,
which will tend to increase E (x̃|x̃ > h (τM )).
I next show that this issue can be remedied by examining a ratio of ATM option prices
with different maturity dates. To formalize this result, I refer to a disclosure with arrival
distribution τ̃A1 as being timelier than a disclosure with arrival distribution τ̃A2 if and only
if the distribution of τ̃A1 is dominated by τ̃A2 in the maximum-likelihood-ratio order.
17
Furthermore, suppose that x̃ = Sθ̃, where S is a positive constant that naturally captures
firm size. Given this definition, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Consider two maturity dates, τM1 and τM2 for which 0 < τM1 < τM2. A
timlier disclosure leads to a greater ratio of a short-term option to a long-term option price,
ΦC0 (k,τM1)
ΦC0 (k,τM2)




is independent of the of the firm’s size.
To understand why the ratio of short- and long- term option prices increases in timeliness,
note that a longer horizon option tends to have greater value than a shorter horizon option
because there is a greater chance that information arrives before its maturity. However, the
likelihood that information arrives after the short-horizon option matures but before the
long-horizon option matures declines when the disclosure tends to arrive more quickly. For
ATM options, this ratio is unaffected by the firm’s size because both the numerator and
17As an example, if τ̃A1 ∼ Exponential (λ1) and τ̃A2 ∼ Exponential (λ2), then τ̃A1 is timelier than τ̃A2
if and only if λ1 > λ2.
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the denominator are proportional to the firm’s size.
The ratio of short- and long- horizon option prices as a measure of the disclosure’s timeliness
may be criticized on the grounds that the information contained in the disclosure might
also arrive from another source. In this case, this ratio will also reflect the timeliness of
external news arrival, which might vary systematically across disclosure events. However,
this concern may be resolved in the case in which the external news arrival is symmetric,
i.e., it is equally informative for both good and bad news. In this case, we can examine the








given that voluntary disclosure informs only about sufficiently positive news, the effect of
its arrival on the value of higher strike options will be greater than its effect on the value
of lower strike options. This will not be true for a symmetric external information arrival.
I leave a fuller exploration of this measure to future research.
2.4. Rederivation of the empirical measures under an asymmetric prior
In this section, I briefly demonstrate how the empirical measures generalize to the possi-
bility that investors’ prior over x̃ is asymmetric. The key takeaway is that fundamental
asymmetry should be controlled for in implementing the measures. Empirically, this might
be operationalized by using the skewness of equity prices leading up to the disclosure date.
Retain the assumptions in Section 3, but suppose now that investors’ prior probability that
x̃ = xH equals q. In this case, the representative investor’s Euler condition implies the
firms’ equity prices equal:
P0 =
qxHu
′ (xH) + (1− q)xLu′ (xL)
qu′ (xH) + (1− q)u′ (xL)
; (2.8)
P1 (yH) =
q (λ− η)xHu′ (xH) + (1− q) (1− λ− η)xLu′ (xL)
q (λ− η)u′ (xH) + (1− q) (1− λ− η)u′ (xL)
P1 (yL) =
q (1− λ+ η)xHu′ (xH) + (1− q) (λ+ η)xLu′ (xL)
q (1− λ+ η)u′ (xH) + (1− q) (λ+ η)u′ (xL)
,
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and their option prices equal:
ΦC (k) =
q (λ− η) (xH − k)u′ (xH) + (1− q) (1− λ− η) (xL − k)u′ (xL)
qu′ (xH) + (1− q)u′ (xL)
. (2.9)




(qu′ (xH) + (1− q)u′ (xL))2
u′ (xH)u′ (xL) q (1− q)
− 1; (2.10)
η =
ΦC (kj)− ΦC (ki)
kj − ki
+
(u′ (xL) (1− λ− q + λq) + u′ (xH) qλ)
qu′ (xH) + (1− q)u′ (xL)
.
This suggests the need to control for fundamental asymmetry, as q enters both expressions
non-linearly in a fashion that interacts with risk aversion. This is primarily an issue in the
calculation of η. Intuitively, fundamental asymmetry causes more informative disclosure to
increase the skewness of the return distribution of the disclosure event. The reason is that a
more informative disclosure causes more of the asymmetric fundamental to be impounded
into price on the disclosure date.
2.5. Identification problems using implied variance and implied skewness
In this section, I demonstrate that the implied-variance (e.g., Britten-Jones and Neuberger
(2000)) and implied-skewness measures (e.g., Bakshi et al. (2003)) used in prior literature
do not cleanly identify the disclosure’s informativeness and asymmetry. Note that date 0
call option prices expiring at date 1 reveal the risk-neutral distribution of the date 1 stock














= fQ (x) .
where FQ (fQ) is the distribution (density) of the stock price at time 1 under the risk-
neutral measure. I next calculate the variance and skewness of the equity price at date 1
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under the risk-neutral measure. Note that in the model, because the stochastic discount
factor equals u
′(x(ω))







E [u′ (x (ω))]
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P̃1 = PH , x̃ = xL
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=
u′ (xH) (λ− η) + u′ (xL) (1− λ− η)







′ (xH) (λ− η) + u′ (xL) (1− λ− η)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
.
Using this distribution to calculate the risk-neutral variance and differentiating with respect














2 (xH − xL)2 (2λ− 1)2
[(λ− η)u′ (xH) + (1− η − λ)u′ (xL)] [(1 + η − λ)u′ (xH) + (λ+ η)u′ (xL)]
.
While this is definitively positive, it is also a non-linear function of η. This implies that it
is difficult to disentangle the dislcosure’s informativeness and asymmetry by examining the
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3




Again, this is a non-linear function of λ, suggesting that it is difficult to disentangle λ and
η from risk-neutral implied skewness.
2.6. General disclosure properties and prior work
In this section, I show that the general definitions of a disclosure’s informativeness and
asymmetry used in Section 5 of Chapter 1 correspond to similar notions found in prior
work. In presenting these results, I begin by summarizing a setting found in a prior body
of work and the notion of a disclosure’s informativeness or asymmetry that this work uses.
Then, I prove that an increase in the notion of informativeness (asymmetry) in fact causes
an increase in the disclosure’s informativeness (asymmetry) in the sense that I defined in
Section 5.
2.6.1. Correspondence between informativeness and other metrics of reporting quality
Example 1, Section 2.
Setting: Suppose that d̃ ∈ {xL, xH} with equal probabilities and the disclosure signal ỹ
has the distribution outlined in Section 2 of the main text. If under disclosure regime R2, λ
is greater under disclosure regime R1, then R2 is more informative according to Definition
1.












FRi (t) dt weakly increases in λ for all
z ∈
(
ξ̃Ri (yL) , ξ̃Ri (yH)
)
and strictly increases for some z ∈
(




for z < ξ̃Ri (yL),
∫ z
ξ̃Ri (yL)
FRi (t) dt equals 0 and is unaffected by λ. For z ∈
[















Differentiating this expression with respect to λ yields 12 (xH − xL) > 0. Next, suppose
z > ξ̃Ri (yH). We have that
∫ z
ξ̃Ri (yL)













(λ− η)xH + (1− λ− η)xL
1− 2η
− (1− λ+ η)xH + (λ+ η)xL
1 + 2η
)
+z − (λ− η)xH + (1− λ− η)xL
1− 2η
= z − 1
2
(xH + xL) .
As this is unaffected by λ, the proof is complete.
Example 2, Diamond (1985), Verrecchia (1990), Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia
(2007).
Setting: The disclosed risk d̃ is normally distributed and the disclosure signal equals d̃+ ε̃
where ε̃ is normally distributed and independent of d̃. If the precision of ε̃ is increased, the
disclosure regime is more informative according to Definition 1.







. This is normally dis-
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 V ar−1 [ε̃;Ri]














Differentiating with respect to V ar [ε̃;Ri], we find that the posterior variance of ξ̃Ri increases





< 0. It is well known that an increase in the variance
of a normal distribution creates a shift in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance.
This implies that an increase in V ar [ε̃;Ri] leads to a reduction in disclosure quality.
Example 3, Gao and Liang (2013).
Setting: The disclosed risk d̃ has an arbitrary distribution, and the disclosure perfectly
reveals d̃ to the market with some probability p. As p increases, the disclosure regime
becomes more informative according to the above definition.






with probability 1− p
d̃ with probability p
 . (2.19)
In order to show that an increase in p corresponds to an increase in disclosure quality, I
must show that ∂∂p
∫ z
dL























































Fξ̃ (t) dt (which may be
proved using integration by parts), this equals:
∫ z
dL















































































































which completes the proof.
Example 4, Demski (1973), Hermalin and Weisbach (2012).
Setting: The disclosed risk d̃ has an arbitrary distribution, and regime R2 dominates
regime R1 in the sense of Blackwell informedness, i.e., the disclosure signal under R2 is a
sufficient statistic for the signal under R1. Then, R2 is more informative than R1 using the
above definition.18
Proof: This result follows from Baker (2006), Lemma 2, which states that a Blackwell-
informedness shift in an information signal leads to a mean-preserving spread in the distri-
18Note that the converse is not true. I avoid defining information quality using Blackwell’s definition
because, as discussed by Demski (1973), it is a very incomplete ranking amongst information systems. In
particular, two information systems cannot be ranked by the Blackwell criterion even when the information
provided by regime approaches zero, as long as that information is independent of the information revealed
by the other regime. This is because the Blackwell criterion requires that all decision makers prefer one
regime to another, which includes the decision maker who only cares about a state with arbitrarily small
measure.
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bution of posterior expectations.
2.6.2. Correspondence between asymmetry and other metrics of reporting conservatism
Example 1, Section 2.
Setting: Suppose that d̃ ∈ {xL, xH} with equal probabilities and the disclosure signal ỹ
has the distribution outlined in Section 2 of the main text. If under disclosure regime R2,
η is higher than under regime R1, then R2 is more informative for good-versus-bad news
than R1 according to Definition 2.
Proof: Again, for z < ξ̃Ri (yL) or z > ξ̃Ri (yH),
∫ z
ξ̃Ri (yL)
FRi (t) dt is unaffected by η. For
z ∈
[
ξ̃Ri (yL) , ξ̃Ri (yH)
]












z − (1− λ+ η)xH + (λ+ η)xL
1 + 2η
)
= z − xH + xL
2
.
Since this has the sign of z − E [x̃], the proof is complete.
Example 2, Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985), Jung and Kwon (1988), Kwon
(2005), Guay and Verrecchia (2006), Gox and Wagenhofer (2010).
Setting: Suppose that d̃ is continuously distributed and takes values in [0,∞]. Con-
sider two disclosure regimes, “conservative” and “voluntary.” In the “voluntary” disclosure
regime, R1, the firm truthfully discloses all states above some threshold TV , while in the
“conservative” regime, R2 the firm truthfully discloses all states below some threshold TC .
Suppose, for simplicity, that TV < TC and the same measure of states is disclosed under
both regimes Fd̃ (TC) = 1−Fd̃ (TV ). Then, R2 is more informative for good-versus-bad news
than R1.
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be the expected value of d̃ given non-disclosure under




be the expected value of d̃ under R2. Then, we have that












Fd̃ (t) dt < 0.






























Fd̃ (t) dt+ (TD − ξNDV )Fd̃ (TD) .








. Upon integrating by parts, one can show
that
∫ TD
0 tfd̃ (t) dt = TDFd̃ (TD)−
∫ TD










0 Fd̃ (t) dt
Fd̃ (TD)
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Fd̃ (t) dt = 0.








dt = 0. Next,





















































































































. This completes the proof.
Example 3, Fan and Zhang (2012), Armstrong et al. (2015).
Setting: In this example, the disclosure signal is equal to the true value of the firm plus
noise, where the true value of the firm and the noise term are normally distributed. A dis-
closure is more downside informative if it is more precise when the firm is performing worse
than expectations, and less precise when the firm is performing better than expectations.
Technically, suppose that d̃ = µ̃1 + µ̃2, where µ̃1 follows a symmetric distribution, and
µ̃2 is normally distributed with parameters E [µ̃2] and V ar [µ̃2]. Suppose that ỹ = d̃ + ε̃,
where the precision of ε̃ depends upon µ̃1 under R2 but not under R1. Formally, under
R2, when µ̃1 > E [µ̃1], V ar
−1 [ε̃] = γ1, while when µ̃1 < E [µ̃1], V ar
−1 [ε̃] = γ2. On the
other hand, for R1, V ar
−1 [ε̃] = γ1+γ22 . Notice that the average precision of the disclosure
is equal in both cases. Furthermore, assume that the market learns µ̃1 at the date of the
disclosure; for instance, it may represent market performance. Then, R2 is more informative
for good-versus-bad news than R1.
Proof: Define κw (z) = Fξ̃R1 |µ̃1=w
(z)−Fξ̃R2 |µ̃1=w
(z), and let fµ̃1 (·) denote the PDF of µ̃1.
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g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw,
where g (z, w) ≡
∫ z
−∞ κw (t) dt. It can be verified that g possesses the following symmetry
properties:
1. For z < E [µ̃1] and z + r > E [µ̃1], g (z, z − r) = g (z, z + r), and
2. For z < E [µ̃1] and z + r < E [µ̃1], g (z, z − r) = −g (z, z + r).
I prove the first result; the second follows similarly. Note that:





















Note that ξ̃1|µ̃1 = z + r and ξ̃2|µ̃1 = z + r are normally distributed with mean z + r + m.
To see this, letting V ≡ V ar−1 [µ̃2] and m ≡ E [µ̃2], we have:
ξ̃R2 =




when µ̃1 < E [µ̃1]
 , (2.31)
while:
ξ̃R1 = µ̃1 +
γ1+γ2































which verifies property 1. Now, assuming that z < E (µ̃1), property 1 implies that:
∫ ∞
−∞




g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ E(µ̃1)
z
g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ ∞
E(µ̃1)




g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ z
z−(E(µ̃1)−z)




g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ ∞
E(µ̃1)




g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ E(µ̃1)
z
g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw > 0,
where the last line follows from symmetry of the distribution of µ̃1 and symmetry property
1. Next, assuming that z > E [µ̃1], symmetry property 2 implies that:
∫ ∞
−∞




g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ z
E[µ̃1]
g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ ∞
z




g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ z
E[µ̃1]




g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ ∞
z+(z−E[µ̃1])




g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw +
∫ z+(z−E[µ̃1])
z
g (z, w) fµ̃1 (w) dw < 0,
where the last line follows from symmetry of the distribution of µ̃1. Thus, setting z = E [µ̃1]
yields the result.
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CHAPTER 3 : Financial Markets with Trade on Risk and Return
3.1. Introduction
Trade in derivatives whose values depend upon their underlying’s risk, such as variance
swaps, is on the rise. Investors appear to trade in these derivatives to speculate on private
information regarding their underlying’s volatility, and, as a result, their prices play a
valuable informational role in the economy, communicating investors’ information about
risk. For example, ETFs tracking the VIX are now among the most actively traded securities
in the market; trading volume in these ETFs is converging to that in the underlying S&P
index itself. Furthermore, the price of the VIX has been termed the economy’s “fear gauge,”
serving as a measure of the market’s beliefs regarding macroeconomic risk.19 Yet, trade in
and pricing of these securities are difficult to explain using traditional models of trade based
on private information (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)), which assume that investors are
perfectly aware of securities’ risk. As a result, these models find that derivatives play only a
risk-sharing role and that their equilibrium prices do not provide investors with information
(Brennan and Cao (1996), Vanden (2006)). In this paper, we demonstrate the more active
role played by derivative securities in a model in which risk-averse investors trade on private
information on both the expected payoff and the risk of a stock.
In our model, investors face uncertainty regarding both the mean and variance of an eq-
uity’s payoffs and possess diverse private information on each of these components, i.e., they
each possess both “mean” and “risk” information. In particular, the “mean” information
received by investors informs them regarding the first moment, or location parameter, of
the equity’s payoffs, while their “risk” information informs them regarding the second mo-
ment, or dispersion parameter, of the equity’s payoffs. In addition to trading in the equity,
19Support for these statements is found throughout the financial press. For example, see The Fearless
Market Ignores Perils Ahead (April 2017, Financial Times), which discusses cases in which the VIX has been
used to speculate on future risk and discusses the recent uptick in trade in the VIX. See also The Snowballing
Power of the VIX, Wall Street’s Fear Index (June 2017, Wall Street Journal), which states, “Invented 24
years ago as a way to warn investors of an imminent crash, the VIX has morphed into a giant casino of its
own.” Finally, note that VIX open interest reached an all-time peak of close to 700,000 contracts in February
2017. See https://ycharts.com/indicators/cboe vix futures open interest.
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investors may trade in a security whose payoff is exclusively a function of the riskiness of
the equity, which we refer to as a variance derivative. This security is meant to capture
trade in derivatives such as variance swaps whose value increases in volatility.20 Our goal
is to examine how investors trade on their two types of information in equilibrium and the
role played by price of the variance derivative.
To begin, we study where investors trade on mean and risk information when they have
access to both securities. We find that uncertainty over the equity’s risk affects how investors
trade on their information regarding expected payoffs. Prior models of trade with known
equity risk demonstrate that investors trade on their beliefs about a stock’s expected payoffs
in equities but not derivatives (Brennan and Cao (1996), Cao and Ou-Yang (2009)). On
the other hand, in the face of risk uncertainty, the variance derivative serves as a form of
insurance against fluctuations in the riskiness of the stock’s payoffs. When the riskiness of
the stock’s payoffs is high, a risk-averse investor who holds an equity position has heightened
marginal utility with respect to their wealth.21 Therefore, they have a desire to “hedge”
by purchasing a security that pays off when equity risk is high; the variance derivative
fills precisely this role. As a result, investors with optimistic mean information purchase
the equity and hedge their positions by holding the variance derivative. Empirically, such
hedging resembles the common practice of using derivatives as portfolio insurance, that is,
taking positions in derivatives such as the VIX to protect against large losses.22
Next, we study the information provided by the prices of the equity and derivative securities
in equilibrium. The model demonstrates that there is an additional driver of trade in the
variance derivative that is not associated with trade in the equity market: trade on risk
information. One might expect that a risk-averse investor with private information that
20As we discuss further in the text, the derivative may also be viewed as a heurtistic approximation to a
zero-delta option position such as a straddle.
21More specifically, prudent preferences, i.e., those characterized by a utility function with a positive third
derivative, exhibit this characteristic.
22Evidence from The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012 suggests that 39% of institutional investors utilize
portfolio hedging strategies. Also, see The Snowballing Power of the VIX, Wall Street’s Fear Index (June
2017, Wall Street Journal) for evidence that the VIX is used as a hedging device, which states, “‘Tail risk’
strategies, designed to steer clear of sudden slumps, often rely on it [the VIX].”
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suggests an equity is risky would downsize their position in this equity. However, in our
model, this is not the case: instead, they hold their equity position fixed and purchase
the variance derivative. Intuitively, when the investor trades on risk information in the
derivative, the only risk they face is that their information signal regarding the equity’s
risk is inaccurate. If the investor were to trade on risk information in the equity itself,
they would face both the risk that their information is inaccurate and the risk that the
equity price moves against them. In sum, there are two components to the investor’s
demand in the variance derivative: a risk-uncertainty hedging component and a speculative
risk-information component. Thus, unlike prior rational expectations models with known
risk, our model suggests the derivative price serves a valuable informational role, enabling
investors to learn about the underlying’s risk. This suggests, for instance, that by serving
as the economy’s “fear gauge,” the price of the VIX may in fact guide investors’ trading
decisions.23
Finally, we study how the price of the variance derivative is related to the equity price
and trading volume in the two markets. The model suggests that the price of the variance
derivative directly enters the risk premium in the equity market. Intuitively, the price of
this derivative reflects the cost to hedging the risk uncertainty induced by a position in the
equity. Therefore, when the derivative price is higher, investors are more reluctant to hold
the equity, such that its risk premium rises. Moreover, a higher derivative price also leads
to a reduction in trade in the equity and derivative markets. The reason is that investors
become less willing to speculate on their information regarding expected payoffs when it is
more costly to hedge the risk uncertainty that results from an equity position.
By analyzing the relationship between risk uncertainty and trade in equities and derivatives
in a unified, information-based framework, our model offers insight into several empirical
findings. First, trading volume in individual equity options tends to predict future equity
23Beyond the VIX, individual equity options also appear to aggregate investors’ private information re-
garding risk; see Mayhew and Stivers (2003), Poon and Granger (2005), Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2008),
and Fahlenbrach and Sand̊as (2010).
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returns (Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Pan and Poteshman (2006)) and trading vol-
ume in options relative to trading volume in their underlying equities varies cross-sectionally
in features such as institutional ownership and liquidity (Roll, Schwartz, and Subramanyam
(2010), Ge, Lin and Pearson (2016)). Our model suggests that these correlations might in
part be explained by novel risk information received by investors. Specifically, we predict
that trading volume in equities is associated with higher contemporaneous equity returns
and lower contemporaneous derivative returns. Intuitively, increases in investors’ percep-
tions of the equity’s risk lead not only to a larger equity risk premium, but also to a
reduction in investors’ willingness to trade on their information. Furthermore, our theory
offers novel predictions on the relationship between trade in derivative securities and the
prices of equities and derivatives, suggesting that investors trade more in a derivative when
its underlying’s price is high and its own price is low.
Second, our model offers insight into the empirical relationship between disagreement and
security returns, for which evidence is mixed (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), John-
son (2004) and Goetzmann and Massa (2005), Carlin, Longstaff, and Matoba (2014)).
Unlike prior rational expectations models that suggest disagreement amongst investors is
not priced (Banerjee (2011), Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2012)),24 our model predicts
that disagreement regarding the security’s expected payoffs reduces its equity price and in-
creases derivative prices. The intuition is as follows. Investors’ desires to hedge their equity
positions in the derivative rise in the magnitude of their equity positions: both investors
who are short and investors who are long the equity are exposed to variance risk and wish
to utilize the derivative to hedge this risk. Since belief dispersion creates variation in in-
vestors’ equity positions, this causes an increase in the demand for, and thus the price of,
the derivative. Again, as the derivative price is directly related to the risk premium in the
24The analysis in Banerjee (2011) states that belief dispersion will increase expected returns in a noisy
rational expectations setting. Note, however, that this is only the case when belief dispersion is created
through a change in the precision of investors’ information (see Proposition 1 of his paper). That is, the
analysis he considers is not a ceteris paribus modification of belief dispersion, but rather, a change in the
underlying information structure that creates belief dispersion. In his model, a ceteris paribus modification
of belief dispersion would have no impact on prices: he states, ”investor disagreement does not affect prices
(while the average beliefs do) (pg. 38).”
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equity market, this increase in the derivative price leads to a decrease in the equity price.
Finally, variance swaps (and other securities whose payoffs increase in systematic volatility,
including options) are priced at a premium, termed the variance risk premium (VRP) (e.g.,
Carr and Wu (2009)). In our model, a VRP may arise due to investors’ desire to hedge risk
uncertainty in the derivative market. In line with empirical evidence that demonstrates
the size of the VRP predicts future equity returns (Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009)),
our model predicts a deterministic relation between the VRP and future equity returns, as
the cost to hedging the risk uncertainty induced by an equity position rises in the VRP.
Moreover, we predict that dispersion in investors’ equilibrium beliefs regarding expected
future cash flows increases the VRP. Finally, we predict that the variance risk premium is
negatively correlated with trading volume in the stock and derivative markets.
Related Literature. Prior rational expectations models have studied trade in options
(Brennan and Cao (1996), Cao (1999), Vanden (2006)). In these models, options complete
the market when investors have heterogenous information quality. However, investors take
deterministic positions in options based on the precision of their information relative to the
average precision of all investors and derivative prices provide no information to investors.
There are two key differences between these papers and ours: first, these models focus on
the case in which the riskiness of the securities’ cash flows is known and the information pos-
sessed by investors orders their posteriors in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.25
Second, while these papers study options, which are affected by both the expected payoff
to the underlying and its risk, the derivative in our model pays off purely as a function of
risk.26 Relatedly, Chabakauri, Yuan, and Zachariadis (2016) study a rational expectations
model in which investors may trade in a full set of contingent claims, again finding that
derivative securities are informationally irrelevant due to the assumptions placed on the
25While some prior literature has examined rational expectations models with non-normal distributions,
and hence, signals that lead to updating on moments other than the first, even in these frameworks, signals
order the posterior distributions in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (e.g., Breon-Drish (2015a),
Vanden (2008)).
26Nevertheless, note that in these prior models, investors use options to create a quadratic position in the
underlying equity payoff. Thus, options are effectively used to create a payoff that increases in risk.
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type of information possessed by investors.
Another set of models has studied trade in options when investors disagree over the mean
and/or variance of future cash flows (but face no uncertainty over the variance) (Detemple
and Selden (1991), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), Cao and Ou-Yang (2009), Oehmke and
Zawadowski (2015)). Most similar to our model, Cao and Ou-Yang (2009) study a setting
in which investors agree to disagree about the mean and precision of a signal and may trade
in a stock or options. They find that disagreements about the mean lead to stock but not
option trade and disagreements over precision lead to trade in both markets, the inverse of
our finding. This difference may be explained by the fact that in their model, the variance of
cash flows is known and information is symmetric. This eliminates updating from derivative
prices and the hedging component of investors’ derivative demands, such that derivatives
serve a different purpose.
Prior literature has examined private-information based trade in options in strategic risk-
neutral settings (Back (1993), Biais and Hillion (1994), Cherian and Jarrow (1998), Easley,
O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Nandi (2000)). Most similar to our paper, Cherian and Jarrow
(1998) and Nandi (2000) study models of strategic trade in which an investor possesses risk
information and trades in options. Note that because strategic investors are risk neutral in
these models, uncertainty over risk has no impact on the equity price and affects options
only through its impact on their expected payoffs. Consequently, these models have no
role for the derivative as a hedging instrument and, unlike our model, find no relationship
between the equity and derivative prices.
Other models offer non-information related reasons for why investors trade derivatives.
For example, Leland (1980) demonstrates that derivative demand may arise from the re-
lationship between investors’ risk aversion and their wealth, and Franke, Stapleton, and
Subrahmanyam (1998) demonstrate that derivative demand may result from unhedgable
background risks. As we abstract from these forces, it is important that these other forces
be taken into consideration in testing our model. Finally, our model is related to the rational
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expectations literature that studies information spillovers when investors face uncertainty
about multiple components of a securities’ risk and may trade in correlated securities (Gold-
stein, Li, and Yang (2014), Goldstein and Yang (2015)). We contribute to this literature by
considering the case in which one component of a securities’ risk is related to its variance.
3.2. Model
The model that we analyze is a one-period model of trade, in the spirit of Hellwig (1980)
and Breon-Drish (2015a). As is typical, we assume that the economy is populated by a
unit continuum of informed investors indexed on [0, 1] with CARA utility u (W ) = −e−
W
τ
and with wealth normalized to zero. Investors have access to a risk-free asset with payoff
normalized to one that is in unlimited supply. Furthermore, they trade in a risky asset (the
stock, or equity) that pays off a one-time dividend of x̃ at the end of the period, with per-
capita supply of z̄. We refer to the ith trader’s position in the stock as DSi. There are three
novel assumptions in the model. First, both the mean and variance of the stock’s payoffs
are unknown to investors: given the realizations of two independent random variables, µ̃










Ṽ must be non-negative, it cannot be Gaussian; we allow Ṽ to take any distribution with
a non-negative support Υ ⊆ <+.
The second novel assumption of the model is that investors separately possess both “mean”
information and “risk” information. Clearly, private information regarding µ̃ concerns the
stock’s expected payoff, while private information regarding Ṽ concerns the stock’s risk.
All informed traders receive information signals regarding µ̃ and Ṽ and traders rationally
use the stock and derivative prices as additional signals.27 The “mean” signal received by








. The “risk” signal









27The model is easily extended to the case in which some traders do not receive a variance signal. However,
as we discuss later, all traders must have homogenous information precision regarding µ̃ to ensure tractability.
28Note that while signals regarding Ṽ may be negative, which may seem to contradict the fact that
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The noise terms ñ, υ̃, ε̃i, and ẽi are independent of the other variables in the model. Note
that in the standard normal prior, normal likelihood set up found throughout the rational
expectations literature, the variance of cash flows falls by a deterministic quantity that
depends upon investors’ information quality. By allowing investors to receive a signal that
directly concerns the variance of cash flows, in our model, investors’ posterior variance is
now a random function that depends on the realized signal η̃i.
The final novel assumption is that investors also trade a third security that has payoffs equal
to the stochastic variance, Ṽ ,29 with per-capita supply of zero. It is natural that in the
presence of an additional source of risk in the stock’s payoffs and heterogenous information
regarding this risk, a market would develop to trade the risk. We refer to this security as
a variance derivative and refer to the ith trader’s position in the derivative as DDi. The
increase in market completeness obtained by the introduction of this security allows for
the construction of a closed-form equilibrium stock price and investor demands conditional
on PD, which enables the study of several applications. In its absence, investors’ demand
functions can only be characterized implicitly. Moreover, in the absence of the variance
derivative, investors would bet on both mean and risk in a single security, the stock, causing
its price to reflect two distinct pieces of information; this would lead to a complex statistical
updating problem.
Our approach to modeling the derivative deviates from prior literature, which studies deriva-
tives with option-like payoffs, or payoffs that are a quadratic or logarithmic function of
returns (Brennan and Cao (1996), Vanden (2006), Cao and Ou-Yang (2009)). In contrast,
we assume that the derivative security’s pay off equals the structural variance that gener-
ates the stock’s payoffs. This raises the question of what such a security represents. We
offer two interpretations. Most clearly, the variance derivative may be seen as a variance
variances are non-negative, a signal η̃i is informationally equivalent to any signal g (η̃i) where g is invertible.
Hence, we could define instead define the signal as η̃′i = e
η̃i to obtain a signal which always takes on
non-negative values.
29It is simple to accomodate the case in which ỹ also pays out the fixed component of the unconditional
variance of x̃, σ2µ, but this adds complexity to the expressions for price and demand while offering no
additional insight.
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swap (e.g., VIX), i.e., a security that pays off proportional to the realized variance of its
underlying’s returns, defined as the sum-of-squared daily returns. Intuitively, if investors
periodically receive noisy information regarding future cash flows, a higher underlying cash
flow risk should manifest as variance in returns. To see this in a simple framework, consider
an extension of the model in which the security’s dividend is equal to the sum of N i.i.d.










for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}.30 More-
over, suppose that after the trading period studied in our model, there are N periods; in
period N , investors learn x̃ i
N
. This set up is intended to capture the notion that investors
periodically learn new, albeit imperfect, information regarding the terminal cash flow x̃.
Finally, suppose that price in each period is a linear function of investors’ expectations


















Taking the limit as N approaches infinity, such that investors continuously receive very
small amounts of information regarding the terminal dividend, this converges to Ṽ , i.e., the
payoff to a variance swap as of the initial trading date, SSR, is precisely proportional to Ṽ .
Second, the variance derivative may be viewed as a heuristic approximation to a “zero-
delta” option position such as a straddle, i.e., an option position that is affected by the
magnitude but not direction of the price movement. Despite the fact that their payoffs are
defined as a function of realized price, the expected payoffs to positions such as straddles
and strangles increase in the riskiness of the stock’s payoffs, Ṽ . Hence, by modelling the
derivative’s payoff as simply equal to Ṽ , we capture the essential element that the expected
payout to the derivative is greater when the variance of the stock’s payoffs is larger. Ni et al.
(2008) offer an empirical measure that corresponds to this interpretation of the derivative,
measuring volatility-based trade in option positions by controlling for their sensitivity to
30Notice that for simplicity of exposition, the mean of x̃ has been set to a known constant of zero.
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directional price movements in their underlyings.31
In order to close the model and prevent the stock price from fully revealing investors’ infor-
mation, we introduce noise into the model by assuming that the investors have exogenous
endowments of the two stochastic components relevant to the asset, µ̃ and Ṽ . This is a
natural extension of the assumption made in prior work such as Wang (1994) and Schneider
(2009) to the case in which there are two traded assets with two independent sources of









and assume that the endowment of trader i in Ṽ is








. Assume that the endowments
{z̃µ, z̃V , z̃µi, z̃V i} are independent of each other and the other variables in the model.
3.3. Equilibrium
We begin by characterizing a rational expectations equilibrium. Denote by PS the equi-
librium price of the stock and by PD equal the equilibrium price of the derivative. Let
Φi =
{
ϕ̃i, η̃i, Z̃µi, Z̃V i, PS , PD
}
represent investor i’s information set. We analyze the stan-
dard definition of a rational expectations equilibrium:
Definition 3 A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair of functions PS , PD such that
investors choose their demands to maximize their utility conditional on their information
set:

















31We note that the model accomodates the case in which the derivative has both “delta” and “vega.”
First, note that a security with both delta and vega can be roughly approximated by taking a position in
both the equity and derivative in my model. Second, suppose that the derivative payoff was instead linear
in x̃ as well as Ṽ , i.e., its pay off was αx̃+βṼ for some α ∈ < and β > 0. In this case, the expression for the
equity price would be materially unchanged as a result of the fact that the derivative is, on average, in zero
net supply. However, trading volume in the asset would be a function of investors’ risk information, as they
would trade in the asset to neutralize the delta provided by a position in the derivative. The derivative price
would equal αPS + βPD where PS and PD are the equity and derivative prices in our model, respectively.
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and, in all states, markets clear:
∫ 1
0
DSi (Φi) di = z̄ (3.3)∫ 1
0
DDi (Φi) di = 0.
To derive the equilibrium, we proceed in three steps: (i) we solve for equity demands and
the equity price for a fixed derivative price; (ii) we solve for the derivative demands and
derivative price for fixed equity demands; (iii) we combine the two markets to show that
there exists a rational expectations equilibrium, which solves a fixed point problem.
Note that given the equilibrium definition, the investors’ demands in the stock and derivative
are allowed to depend on both the derivative price and the stock price. As a result, it is
possible that the stock and derivative prices each contain information on both µ̃ and Ṽ .
We specialize slightly further in the equilibria we consider. In particular, we consider only
equilibria in which the derivative price does not reveal any information incremental to the
stock price regarding µ̃ and the stock price does not reveal any information incremental to
the derivative price regarding Ṽ . Technically, we take the following approach. Let FPS (·)
represent the distribution function of PS and FPD (·) represent the distribution function of
PD. We conjecture an equilibrium in which the derivative price is conditionally independent
of µ̃ given the stock price, i.e., FPD (·|PS , µ̃) = FPD (·|PS) and the stock price is conditionally




= FPS (·|PD). This implies
that investors use the stock price to update on expected payoffs and the derivative price
to update on the riskiness of payoffs. We then show that given such a conjecture, the





= FPS (·|PD), demonstrating the existence of such an equilibrium. In fact,
one needs only to conjecture that one of these two properties holds, and the other will
follow in equilibrium. However, we have not been able to rule out the possibility of other
equilibria.
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Beginning with the stock market, we follow the standard procedure of conjecturing a linear
equilibrium,
PS = α̃0 + αµ (µ̃+ ñ) + αz z̃µ, (3.4)




= FPS (·|PD), α̃0 may depend upon Ṽ only
through PD, and hence is known to investors. The following proposition summarizes the
equilibrium equity demands and equity price for a given derivative price PD. In the ap-
pendix, we derive expressions for α0, αµ, and αz.
Proposition 9 The investors’ equity demands and the equilibrium equity price given a
derivative price PD satisfy:
DSi = τ
E (x̃|Φi)− PS
PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
− V ar (µ̃|Φi) Z̃µi











z̄ (PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)) .
To understand the expression for investors’ demands, note that in the classical mean-
variance framework with known variance and no derivative security, their demands would
equal their expected payoff less price divided by the variance, less their endowment:
τ E(x̃|Φi)−PSV ar(x̃|Φi) − Z̃µi. In the present setting, we again have a numerator equal to the expected
payoff minus price and the investors’ demands are adjusted for their endowment of µ̃. How-
ever, the denominator, which captures the investor’s adjustment for risk, is now modified
as there are two components of risk when trading in the stock: that of the uncertain mean,
µ̃, and the stochastic variance, Ṽ . As is the case in the classical framework, the variance
of the uncertain mean component is added to the denominator since it follows a normal
distribution. On the other hand, to account for the riskiness of the stochastic variance Ṽ ,
the denominator includes the price of the derivative security PD, which in general is not





To provide an intuition for why investors discount the risk associated with Ṽ at the price
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of the derivative security, consider investor i’s expected utility conditional on Ṽ when their


























V ar (µ̃|Φi) + Ṽ
)]}
.
Notice that the investor’s expected utility is decreasing in a linear combination of the payoff




, and the riskiness of the equity position, D2SiṼ .
As a result, the exposure to Ṽ created by a position in the stock, τ−1D2SiṼ can effectively
be hedged by taking a position in the derivative, which comes at the price of PD. When PD
rises, this exposure becomes costlier to hedge, and hence, investors will treat the stock as
though it were riskier. The proof provided in the appendix demonstrates that this intuition
continues to hold upon taking the expectation over Ṽ and upon accounting for investors’
random endowments.
Importantly, the equity demands DSi are not directly a function of investors’ risk signals
η̃i, given the conjecture that FPD (·|PS , µ̃) = FPD (·|PS). Thus, despite the fact that in-
vestors’ risk signals provide them with information regarding the riskiness of the stock,
they choose not to take into account these signals η̃i when trading in the stock market. As
a result, the conjecture that the stock price is informationally redundant with respect to
Ṽ is verified. Note that the following corollary does not imply that the stock market and
derivative markets function independently. Instead, the corollary only states that investors’
risk information can only affect the equity price through the price of the derivative, PD.






With the equilibrium in the stock market established, now consider the equilibrium deriva-
tive price for fixed equity demands, {DSi}i∈[0,1]. As the distribution of a variance must be
bounded below by zero, the distribution of the payoff of the derivative cannot be assumed
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normal. To make the model as general as possible, we allow for an arbitrary distribution of
Ṽ . In order to derive the rational expectations equilibrium in this general case, we apply
the approach of Breon-Drish (2015b), summarized below.
First, conjecture a generalized linear equilibrium, i.e., one in which price is a monotonic
transformation of a linear function of investors’ aggregate information signal Ṽ + υ̃ and














+ z̃V for some a ∈ < to be determined as part of the
equilibrium and a strictly increasing function δ. Given this conjecture, investors are able to
invert l
(
Ṽ + υ̃, z̃V
)
from the derivative price. Due to the fact that the additive error terms
in η̃i and l̃ are normally distributed, η̃i, l̃, and Z̃V i are normally distributed conditional
on Ṽ . This implies that the distribution of Ṽ given
(
η̃i, l̃, Z̃V i
)
falls into the exponential



















. When investors have CARA
utility and the distribution of payoffs takes this form, their demands are additively separable
in their private signal η̃i, the price signal l̃, their endowment Z̃V i, and a monotonic function
of PD. By examining the market-clearing condition, it can be seen that PD indeed takes the




Ṽ + υ̃, z̃V
))
. The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 10 Suppose that investor i demands DSi units of the stock. Then, investor
i’s derivative demand equals:
DDi = k1 (a
∗) η̃i + k2 (a
∗) l̃ + k3 (a




where k1 (·), k2 (·), k3 (·), g (·), and a∗ are defined in the appendix. The equilibrium deriva-
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for a function r (·) defined in the appendix. PD is positive, increasing in Ṽ and υ̃, and
decreasing in z̃V .
Critically, investors’ derivative demands contain a new component that reveals an important
interaction between the two markets. In particular, investor i’s demand is increasing in the
square of their position in the stock, 12τD
2
Si. This arises from the investors’ desire to hedge
risk uncertainty: since the investors’ utility functions have a positive third derivative, they
prefer skewed payoff distributions (Kimball (1990)). By purchasing the derivative, an equity
investor has a greater level of wealth when they face more risk, leading to payoff skewness.32
Note that this hedging component of investors’ derivative demands lead both investors who
short the stock and investors who long the stock hold positions in the derivative. Moreover,
it creates a link between the derivative price and investors’ equity demands through the





Although investors’ equity demands affect the derivative price and these demands are af-
fected by their private information and endowments, ϕ̃i and Z̃µi, the derivative price is
nevertheless informationally redundant with respect to µ̃. Substituting the equity price in
Proposition 9 into investors’ equity demands, we find that their equity demands are linear
in the difference between their private mean signal (ϕ̃i) and the average mean signal (µ̃) and
in their mean-zero idiosyncratic endowments z̃µi. As a result, the aggregate risk-uncertainty




Sidi, is a function only of µ̃
only through the term
∫ 1
0 (ϕ̃i − µ̃)












µidi depend upon investors’ information quality
32See footnote 18 in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) for a discussion of why this holds even for CARA
utility, which is generally interpreted as having a preference for risk that is independent of wealth. The
notion of preferences across distributions is distinct from the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, which
assesses how much an investor is willing to pay to eliminate a risk at any given wealth level. The Arrow-Pratt
measure also takes into account an investor’s marginal utility at a given wealth level.
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Figure 7: This figure depicts the interplay between the equity and the variance derivative
markets, given that the derivative insures against fluctuations in Ṽ induced by a position
in the equity. Trade in the equity affects the derivative price through investors’ desire to
hedge risk uncertainty. This in turn, affects the equity market through the risk premium
associated with Ṽ .
and endowment noise but not on µ̃ or z̃µi themselves. In sum, we have the following result:
Corollary 5 The derivative price is informationally redundant with respect to µ̃. That is,
FPD (·|PS , µ̃) = FPD (·|PS).
This result also demonstrates that the derivative price would perfectly reveal investors’
aggregate risk signal,
∫ 1
0 ϕ̃idi = Ṽ + υ̃, in the absence of noise in investors’ endowments
of Ṽ . One might posit that investors’ risk-uncertainty hedging demands would serve as
a form of noise trade in the derivative markets, obviating the need to directly introduce
additional noise into the derivative market. However, this is not the case, as investors’
aggregate hedging demands are unaffected by µ̃ and z̃µ. Specifically, notice that expression

















Sidi is independent of µ̃ and z̃µ, this implies
that the derivative price could be inverted to derive Ṽ + υ̃.
Now that the two markets have been examined in isolation, taking the price and demands
in the other market as fixed, we consider both markets in tandem and show that there exists
an equilibrium.
Proposition 11 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium PS , PD.
The existence of an equilibrium boils down to the existence of a solution to a fixed-point
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problem; the nature of this problem is depicted in Figure 7. Expression (3.5) shows that the




Sidi, is a decreasing function of
the derivative price, PD. Intuitively, when PD is larger, investors are more reluctant to trade
on their information because it is costlier to hedge the risk uncertainty that results from a
directional equity position. In other words, when PD is higher, the investor is more averse
to the variance risk induced by an equity position; we thus refer to this effect in the figure
as the variance risk premium (note we discuss the variance risk premium further in section




Sidi, such that finding
an equilibrium requires solving for a fixed point PD. Note that as in Wang (1994) and
Schneider (2008), the assumption that noise in the model stems from noisy endowments
rather than noise trade works against equilibrium uniqueness; that is, the possibility of
multiple equilibria stems purely from the standard assumptions on endowment noise, rather
than risk uncertainty, the inclusion of a variance derivative, or risk information.33
Note that in our model, investors face two components of risk in a single security, the
equity. It is insightful to compare our model to prior rational expectations models with
multidimensional risk. Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014) study a model in which investors
trade in two related securities with a common component affecting the expected returns
to both securities. Goldstein and Yang (2015) study a model in which investors have
information on two components of a security’s cash flow. These papers demonstrate that
uncertainty and learning regarding one factor tends have spillover effects on the other factor.
Unlike these papers, the two components of uncertainty in our model affect different mo-
ments of the cash flow distribution. This creates new economic forces that do not appear
in the set up in which each component affects expected payoffs: the realization of investors’
information regarding risk affects both the risk premium and investors’ trading intensities in
the second security. Thus, while Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014) document that uncertainty
33We have solved the model under the assumption of fixed endowments and noise trade and found a unique
equilibrium. However, the required assumptions on the behavior of noise traders to ensure the existence of
a tractable equilibrium are ad hoc.
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regarding one component of cash flows has spillover effects on investors’ trading intensities
in both markets, our model suggests that the price of the variance derivative itself affects
how intensely investors trade on their information and causes the derivative price to enter
the equity’s risk premium (i.e., cost of capital). These forces are crucial to the applications
studied below, leading to relationships between price changes and trading volume in both
markets.
3.4. Trading volume and price changes
In this section, we analyze the relationships between trading volume and price changes
within and across equity and derivative markets. To summarize the results, note that
Propositions 9 and 10 reveal three key relationships: i) the risk premium in the equity
market increases in the derivative price, ii) investors’ willingness to trade on their mean-
based information in the equity decreases in the derivative price, and iii) when investors
trade more in the equity, they also trade more in the derivative to hedge risk uncertainty.
Analyzing these effects jointly, increases in the derivative price and reductions in the equity
price are negatively associated with trading volume in the equity and derivative.
Critically, these results are founded on 1) investor risk aversion and 2) a derivative security
that pays off purely as a function of its underlyings’ volatility. Therefore, they apply most
directly to trade in the VIX (and similar securities), which possesses risk that is primarily
systematic in nature and pays off purely as a function of realized volatility. However,
note that our results also provide insight into option trade that is driven by a demand
for exposure to volatility; again this has been measured by controlling for option “delta”
(Ni et al. (2008)). An empirical literature has studied trade in options versus stocks,
arguing that the relative trading volume in each security tends to be driven by concerns
for leverage and liquidity (e.g., Easley et al. (1998), Pan and Poteshman (2006), Ni et al.
(2008), Fahlenbrach and Sand̊as (2010), Roll et al. (2010), and Johnson and So (2012)).
Our model suggests that the correlations discovered in these papers might in part reflect
innovations to risk and risk information, which jointly impact trading volume and prices.
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We begin by characterizing trading volume in the two markets. Formally, we define trading
volume in the stock and derivative as the total differences between investors’ equilibrium
demands and the average endowments. That is, let trading volume (double counted) in
the stock equal V olS ≡
∫ 1
0




∣∣∣DDi − ∫ 10 DDidi∣∣∣ di. The next proposition formally characterizes volume in the
two markets.
Proposition 12 Trading volume in the stock market is equal to:





0 E (x̃|Φi) di− τ
−1V ar (µ̃|Φi) z̃µi
PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
∣∣∣∣∣ di (3.10)












∗)− 1) z̃V i
∣∣∣∣ di. (3.11)
Volume in the stock market has two components, a component related to speculation on in-
vestors’ beliefs regarding µ̃,
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣E (µ̃|Φi)− ∫ 10 E (µ̃|Φi) di∣∣∣ di, and a risk-sharing component,
τ−1V ar (µ̃|Φi) z̃µi. Importantly, note that investors’ willingness to trade on their informa-
tion is disciplined by their assessment of the riskiness of the stock’s payoffs, as measured by
PD+V ar (µ̃|Φi). This reveals an interaction between the stock and derivative markets: any
force that raises the derivative price also leads to a reduction in trade in the stock market.
For instance, innovations to Ṽ , υ̃, or z̃V reduce trade in the stock market. Likewise, changes
in investors’ risk-information quality or changes in the distribution of Ṽ that cause PD to
increase also reduce trade in the stock market.
Next, Proposition 12 shows that trading volume in the variance derivative has three com-
ponents, a risk-information component, τk1 (a










, and a risk-sharing component, (τk3 (a
∗)− 1) z̃V i. Risk-information
related trade is driven by the deviation between the signal received by investor i, η̃i, and
the average signal received by investors,
∫ 1
0 η̃idi = υ̃, that is, ẽi. Risk-uncertainty hedging
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related trade results from differences in investors’ equilibrium beliefs regarding µ̃. Such
differences in beliefs lead investors to hold disparate positions in the stock. Investors who
hold large positions in the stock hedge the resulting variance uncertainty by purchasing the
derivative from investors with smaller positions in the stock. Finally, variance-risk sharing
trade simply captures investors’ wish to trade away their idiosyncratic outside endowments
of Ṽ .
Note that because the derivative price impacts trading volume in the equity, it also has a
spillover effect on trading volume in the derivative market. Since investors’ desires to hedge
risk uncertainty are driven by their equity positions, a reduction in trade in the equity
market also leads to a reduction in the risk-uncertainty hedging component of derivative
trade. Therefore, the derivative price PD is negatively associated with trade in both markets.
Finally, because the derivative price enters the equity risk premium, this suggests that the
equity price is positively associated with trade in both markets. In sum, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 6 i) Increases in the derivative price driven by greater Ṽ or υ̃, or smaller z̃V ,
changes in the parameters σ2zV , σ
2
zV i
, σ2υ, or σ
2
e, or in the distribution of Ṽ lead to a decline
in trade in the stock.
ii) Increases in the derivative price driven by greater Ṽ or υ̃, or smaller z̃V lead to a decline
in trade in the variance derivative.
The first part of the corollary states that any change in the underlying information structure
of the model or the realized level of risk and noise in the derivative security decreases trad-
ing volume in the equity market. The second part of the corollary is weaker: it states only
that changes in the derivative price driven by the shocks Ṽ , υ̃, and z̃V decrease trade in the
derivative. Intuitively, the information structure affects trade in the derivative market in
two, potentially opposing ways: directly, through the risk-information component of trade,
and indirectly, through its impact on investors’ willingness to trade on their mean informa-
tion. This renders comparative statics of derivative trade with respect to the information
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structure difficult. In contrast, increases in the derivative price driven by Ṽ or z̃V affect the
risk-uncertainty hedging component of trading volume only, and hence, definitively lead to
a reduction in derivative volume.
This corollary has immediate implications for the covariance between trading volume in
equities and derivatives and price changes in the two markets. Formally, suppose that
prior to trade, there exist initial prices PS,0 and PD,0 and define ∆PS ≡ PS − PS,0 and
∆PD ≡ PD − PD,0. Then, we have the following result.
Corollary 7 The statistical relationship between contemporaneous returns in the stock and
derivative and trading volume in the two markets can be summarized as follows:
i) Cov (∆PS , V olS) > 0,
ii) Cov (∆PS , V olD) > 0,
iii) Cov (∆PD, V olS) < 0,
iv) Cov (∆PD, V olD) < 0.
3.5. Belief Dispersion and Prices
A well-documented result is that in a perfectly competitive rational expectations equilib-
rium, only the average expectation of payoffs across investors and the average precision of
investors’ beliefs affect expected returns (e.g., Banerjee (2011), Lambert, Leuz, and Ver-
recchia (2012)). The thought experiment posed by these studies is as follows. Consider a
change in the underlying parameters of the model, such as the quality of investors’ private
information and the extent of noise trade, that causes investors’ beliefs and equilibrium
demands to diverge, but leads to no change in the average quality of their information.
These studies show that under the standard utility and distributional assumptions made in
noisy rational expectations models, the risk premium is purely a function of the precision
of investors’ posteriors, and hence, prices will not change, on average. Our model suggests
that in the presence of uncertainty over a security’s risk, greater differences in investors’
equilibrium beliefs lead to decreases in its equity price and increases in the price of the
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variance derivative.
Our results have implications for the empirical literature that studies the effect of dis-
agreement on individual equity prices, which documents mixed results on the relationship
between disagreement and equity prices depending upon the empirical proxy used to capture
disagreement (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Johnson (2004) and Goetzmann and
Massa (2005), Carlin, Longstaff, and Matoba (2014)). Our model suggests that investors’
risk preferences alone may lead to a positive relationship between disagreement and future
returns both in equity markets and derivative markets. Furthermore, empirically, our re-
sults suggest that the relationship between disagreement and future returns to a security
should rise as investors face more uncertainty regarding that securities’ risk.
Expression (3.9) demonstrates that the price of the variance derivative (and thus the risk





Sidi. This term reflects the aggregate desire of investors to hedge the
risk uncertainty created by their positions in the stock. Define the dispersion in investors’





















PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
)2






Sidi increases in the dispersion in investors’ equilibrium beliefs. Intuitively, when
investors’ beliefs grow disparate, optimistic investors increase their positions in the stock
market and pessimistic investors decrease their positions. As investors’ desire to hedge risk
uncertainty is a function of their squared demand for the stock, both types of investors have
a greater desire to hedge, and thus, the derivative price increases. Since this raises the cost
to hedging the risk uncertainty that accompanies a position in the equity, this increases the
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equity risk premium. Note that in equilibrium, variation in investors’ beliefs holding fixed





and σ2zµi . In sum we have the following proposition:
34
Proposition 13 Holding fixed the precision of investors’ beliefs regarding µ̃, the deriva-
tive price PD increases and the expected stock price E (PS) decreases in the dispersion in






0 E (x̃|Φi) di
)2
di.
3.6. Variance Risk Premium
A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that, at both the index and individual
equity level, variance swaps have prices that overshoot investors’ expectations of the under-
lying return variance. The size of this premium has been termed the variance risk premium
(VRP) (e.g., Bakshi and Kapadia (2003), Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), Carr and
Wu (2009)). Existing theory argues that the index-level VRP results from variance swaps’
negative betas: when realized market variance is high, returns tend to be low (Carr and
Wu (2009)). Alternatively, Bakshi and Madan (2006) argue that the VRP may arise from
investors’ preferences for higher moments. In line with the latter explanation, in our model,
a variance risk premium can arise due to investors’ preference for skewness; the variance
derivative pays off when risk is high, such that holding the derivative alongside the equity
creates positive skewness in the investors’ wealth distribution. In our model, the size of
this premium is related to the dispersion in investors’ beliefs regarding µ̃, trading volume in
the equity and derivative markets, and the equity price. Note that our model speaks most
strongly to index-level variance risk premia, where investors’ risk aversion plays a greater
role.
Specifically, we define the VRP as −1 times the average over investors’ expectations of the
34Note that we have also solved the model in the case in which investors have exogenous variation in their
prior beliefs regarding the mean of x̃. Variation in prior beliefs also is priced, unlike in prior models. These
results are available upon request.
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PD − Ṽ |Φi
)
di. (3.14)
This definition captures the difference between how investors price the variance derivative
Ṽ and their average expectation of the future variance. As discussed in section 3.2, the
variance derivative’s price may be seen as the price of a variance swap. Moreover, the






di, should, in expectation, approximate
the ex-post realized variance Ṽ . Thus, the definition corresponds closely to the empirical
measures found in Carr and Wu (2009) and Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), which
equal the price of the variance swap less the ex-post realized return variance. Note that
under this definition, a higher VRP corresponds to a greater excess valuation of the variance
derivative. That is, unlike the risk premium in the equity market, which tends to be
negative, the VRP is generally positive.
First, note that section 3.5 suggests the price of the variance derivative is related to investors’






0 E (x̃|Φi) di
)2
di. Therefore, the VRP
increases in investors’ equilibrium disagreement over µ̃. Interestingly, this suggests that
despite the fact that µ̃ has no direct impact on investors’ beliefs regarding Ṽ , the VRP
is affected by investors’ private information quality regarding µ̃ (σ2n and σ
2
ε), the amount
of noise in investors’ endowments of η̃ (σ2zµ and σ
2
zµi), and prior uncertainty over µ̃ (σ
2
µ).
Intuitively, disagreement regarding µ̃ indirectly lead them to hold different quantities of Ṽ
in equilibrium, which affects the VRP.
Second, the model implies a negative relationship between the variance risk premium and
trading volume in the two markets. In particular, Corollary 7 implies that when the deriva-
tive price is higher (corresponding to a higher VRP), investors are more averse to the risk
uncertainty that results from a position in the stock market. This makes them less willing
to trade on their information regarding µ̃, such that trading volumes in both the stock and
derivative are lower.
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Finally, the model also suggests a connection between the variance risk premium and future
equity returns, which has been empirically validated (Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009)).
This follows trivially from expression (3.5), which shows that the risk premium in the stock
market increases with PD. Effectively, both the VRP and the equity price capture investors’
aversion to variance uncertainty. In summary, we have the following proposition.







0 E (x̃|Φi) di
)2
di.
ii) The variance risk premium is negatively correlated with trading volume in the stock and
derivative markets.
iii) The equilibrium equity price decreases one-for-one with increases in the variance risk
premium.
As a final point, note that the one-for-one relationship between the VRP and the equity
price implies that even when driven by noise, increases in the derivative price lead to an
increase in the equity risk premium. When investors’ noisy endowments of Ṽ are greater,
they must hold more of Ṽ in equilibrium, which causes them to demand a greater VRP. If
the investors had mean-variance preferences rather than CARA utility, their demands for
the stock would be unaffected by their endowments in Ṽ , because the stock has a covariance






This article develops a noisy rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors
possess information not only on a stock’s expected payoffs, but also the risk of these payoffs.
Investors in the model can trade in a stock or a derivative security whose value increases






















in the riskiness of the stock’s payoffs. In the equilibrium studied in the model, the stock
price serves as an aggregator of investors’ mean information regarding and the derivative
price serves as an aggregator of investors’ risk information. Investors trade on information
regarding expected payoffs in both the stock and derivative markets, as the derivative serves
as insurance against adverse fluctuations in the risk of the stock’s payoffs. On the other
hand, investors trade on risk information in the derivative only. The model has implications
for relationship between trading volume in stock and derivative markets and the respective
prices in these two markets. Moreover, it suggests that belief dispersion impacts expected
stock returns and derivative prices. Finally, it justifies the empirically documented negative
relationship between the variance risk premium and returns in the stock market and offers
predictions on the association between trading volume, information quality, and variance
risk premia.
In the current set up of the model, investors have homogenous information quality, which
leads to a derivative price that is uninformative regarding investors’ information regarding
expected equity payoffs. Preliminary investigation suggests that this will not be the case
when investors have heterogenous information quality, since, in this case, the dispersion in
their beliefs will be a function of the fundamental µ̃. It may be interesting, but technically
challenging, to study the value of the derivative price to investors when it aggregates both
information on the mean of future cash flows and their risk. Furthermore, a weakness of the
model is that because the variance distribution is fully general, it is difficult to offer much
intuition into how the parameters of the variance distribution impact the derivative price.
It may be interesting to study more specific distributions of the variance Ṽ in order to offer
more definitive comparative statics on the drivers of the derivative price in the model.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Empirical estimation in Chapter 1
In this appendix, I detail the empirical approach to measuring a disclosure’s informativeness
and asymmetry using call option prices. For simplicity, I develop the measures in the
discrete-time risk-aversion case, but they are easily shown to be robust to continuous trade.36
In the Internet Appendix, I show how these measures extend to the case of an asymmetric
prior, and demonstrate the need to control for asymmetry in the firm’s fundamentals.
Note that the model suggests that attention should be restricted to call options whose ex-
piration date is after the disclosure date but as close to the disclosure date as possible;
furthermore, option prices should be measured just prior to the disclosure event. Intu-
itively, this ensures that the option’s price is minimally affected by sources of volatility
other than the disclosure at hand, which could confound the measures. Suppose that the
traded options with expiration closest to the announcement have strike prices k1,...,kn.
According to Proposition 2, recall that the theoretical price of a call option with strike
ki ∈ (P1 (yL) , P1 (yH)) equals:
ΦC (ki) =
(λ− η) (xH − ki)u′ (xH) + (1− λ− η) (xL − ki)u′ (xL)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
. (A.1)
We wish to map observed option prices into this formula in order to develop estimators of
λ and η. First, consider an estimator of disclosure’s informativeness, λ. Let P ∗ denote the
last-quoted equity price prior to the disclosure event and let ΦC (P ∗) denote the price of
the call option with strike closest to P ∗ at time close to the time P ∗ is quoted. Substituting
ki = P
∗ into expression (A.1) and simplifying, we find that:
ΦC (P ∗) =
u′ (xH)u
′ (xL)
(u′ (xH) + u′ (xL))
2 (xH − xL) (2λ− 1) . (A.2)
36In the case of general distributions, there is no single parameter corresponding to informativeness or
asymmetry that can be measured, but Propositions 4 and 5 nonetheless suggest a directional relationship
between these properties and the measures developed in this section.
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Note that if the investors holding any given firm have different risk aversions, this might
confound empirical tests. Expression (A.3) is not quite an empirical estimate of λ, as
the denominator xH − xL, which captures investors’ prior uncertainty regarding the firm’s
performance, clearly varies across disclosure dates and is likely correlated with prominent
firm characteristics such as firm size and leverage. However, suppose we have a consistent






Intuitively, we simply normalize the ATM option price by ẑ. This leaves the question of how
to estimate xH − xL; I offer two possibilities. First, suppose that investors receive informa-
tion regarding x̃ leading up to the disclosure date either publicly or privately. Then, equity
prices leading up to the disclosure date vary as this information is impounded into price,
and the size of this variation should be directly related to xH − xL, such that historical
equity-price volatility leading up to the disclosure may proxy for xH − xL.37 However, this
measure may be confounded by the properties that drive the amount of information regard-
ing x̃ that is impounded into returns prior to the disclosure. A second possible estimator ẑ
is the firm’s stock price, which roughly captures the amount of (dollar) uncertainty faced by
investors if firms’ expected cash flows and cash flow variances are linked. Note that another
approach is to match on size, price volatility, and/or other measures of xH −xL rather than
normalizing by their values.
37It is critical to use price, not return volatility. Using a measure that normalizes by return volatility will
fail to correct for scale effects, i.e., it will be mechanically impacted by firm size.
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Next, consider the estimation of η. Expression (A.1) implies that for any kj 6= ki,
η =
ΦC (kj)− ΦC (ki)
kj − ki
+
u′ (xL) + (u
′ (xH)− u′ (xL))λ
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
. (A.5)
Thus, consider an estimator:
η̂ =
ΦC (kj)− ΦC (ki)
kj − ki
. (A.6)
Expression (A.5) suggests that this estimate is valid contingent on controlling for our esti-
mator λ̂; this is because λ also affects the relative price of option contracts with different
strikes. Expression (A.5) also suggests that a linear control is sufficient. When the repre-
sentative agent is risk neutral, note that expression (A.5) reduces to:
η̂ =





suggesting that a control for λ is unnecessary in this case.
While η̂ may be calculated using the prices of any two option contracts in this simple setting,
the most robust approach is to compare the price of an ITM to the price of an OTM option
contract. The reason is that, as discussed in Section 4, for very general distributions, OTM
option prices relative to ITM option prices increase in disclosure’s informativeness for good-
versus-bad news. On the other hand, in general, the relative prices of, say, deep OTM to
slightly OTM option prices might not exhibit such a pattern.
Next, I note that call options that are substantially ITM are typically illiquid. However,
the effect of η on options that are too close to being ATM is small and thus may be strongly
influenced by noise, leading to low power tests. Thus, in calculating η̂, the optimal choice
may be a moderately ITM and a moderately OTM option contract. In large cross-sectional
studies, a facile approach may be to choose options that are as close as possible to a fixed
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fractional percentage away from ATM for each firm. In sum, we have the following estimator:
η̂ =
ΦC (kj)− ΦC (ki)
kj − ki
(A.8)
for ki moderately greater than P
∗
and kj moderately smaller than P
∗.
A.2. Proofs of technical results in Chapter 1
Throughout the appendix, I demonstrate the results for call options, as the results for put options are proved
in the same manner.
Proof of Lemma 2. Proof of Part 1) This follows trivially given that P0 =
xL+xH
2
is not a function of
λ or η.




















(1− λ+ η)xH + (λ+ η)xL
1 + 2η







1− 4η2 (xH − xL)
2 .
























which is unaffected by λ.

















since λ ≥ 1
2




Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. These results are a special case of Proposition 2 when
u (x) = x.
Proof of Lemma 3. Denote by (Ω,F ,Π) a probability space that generates the distributions of x and P1
described in the main text. In this case, we may view x̃ and P̃1 as functions mapping states ω ∈ Ω into the









dΠ (ω). Using this notation, we have the
following result, which is a variation of the well-known Euler condition that holds in complete markets with
utility-maximizing agents.






Proof. First, it is well known that markets are complete given the existence of a complete set of options,
which implies the existence of a stochastic discount factor, π (ω). Therefore, the representative agent’s










π (ω) c (ω) dΠ (ω) = W .
This problem has Lagrangian, where κ is the multiplier:
L
(










π (ω) c (ω) dΠ (ω)
)
. (A.14)
Differentiating pointwise with respect to c (ω) yields:





Utilizing the fact that the risk-free rate is 1, no arbitrage requires that the state prices sum to 1, i.e.,∫




u′ (c (ω)) dΠ (ω) , (A.16)
such that π (ω) = u
′(c(ω))∫
Ω u
′(c(ω))dΠ(ω) . By the market-clearing condition, in equilibrium, we must have c (ω) =
x (ω), such that π (ω) = u
′(x(ω))∫
Ω u
′(x(ω))dΠ(ω) By the definition of the stochastic discount factor, the lemma now
follows.



















. Applying the prior lemma and the joint distribution of these events,
82
we arrive at the following equilibrium price at time 0:
P0 =
xH Pr (x̃ = xH)u
′ (xH) + xL Pr (x̃ = xL)u
′ (xL)




′ (xH) + xLu
′ (xL)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
,
and the following equilibrium price given yH and yL:
P1 (yH) =
Pr (x̃ = xH |yH)xHu′ (xH) + Pr (x̃ = xL|yH)xLu′ (xL)
Pr (x̃ = xH |yH)u′ (xH) + Pr (x̃ = xL|yH)u′ (xL)
(A.18)
=
(λ− η)xHu′ (xH) + (1− η − λ)xLu′ (xL)
(λ− η)u′ (xH) + (1− η − λ)u′ (xL)
and
P1 (yL) =
Pr (x̃ = xH |yL)xHu′ (xH) + Pr (x̃ = xL|yL)xLu′ (xL)
Pr (x̃ = xH |yL)u′ (xH) + Pr (x̃ = xL|yL)u′ (xL)
(A.19)
=
(1 + η − λ)xHu′ (xH) + (λ+ η)xLu′ (xL)
(1 + η − λ)u′ (xH) + (λ+ η)u′ (xL)
.
Proof of Part 1) To see this, notice that for any concave utility function u (·), we have:
P0 =
xHu
′ (xH) + xLu
′ (xL)




= E (x̃) ; (A.20)
P1 (yH) =
(λ− η)xHu′ (xH) + (1− η − λ)xLu′ (xL)
(λ− η)u′ (xH) + (1− η − λ)u′ (xL)
<
(λ− η)xH + (1− η − λ)xL
(λ− η) + (1− η − λ) = E (x̃|ỹ = yH) ;
P1 (yL) =
(1 + η − λ)xHu′ (xH) + (λ+ η)xLu′ (xL)
(1 + η − λ)u′ (xH) + (λ+ η)u′ (xL)
<
(1 + η − λ)xH + (λ+ η)xL
(1 + η − λ) + (λ+ η) = E (x̃|ỹ = yL) .




is unaffected by λ and η.












































u′ (xL)− u′ (xH)
]















Since u is concave, u′ (xL) − u′ (xH) > 0. To complete the proof, I show the final term is positive by
considering the two cases in which η ≥ 0 and η < 0. First consider the case η ≥ 0. Then, λ+ η ≤ 1 implies
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that λ ≤ 1− η. We thus have:
2η
(












u′ (xH)− u′ (xL)
)
(2 (1− η)− 1) + (1− 2η) (1 + 2η)
(





u′ (xH) (1 + 4η) + u
′ (xL) + 4Aη
)
≥ 0,
with equality only when η = 1
2
. However, note that η = 1
2
can only occur when λ = 1
2
, in which case λ
cannot be increased any further; thus, it must be the case this expression is strictly positive. Next, consider
the case in which η < 0. Note that λ+ η > 1
2
implies λ > 1
2
− η such that:
2η
(






















+ (1− 2η) (1 + 2η)
(













u′ (xH) ≥ 0.
Proof of Part 4) Let P ∗1 (ỹ) be the observed equity price at time 1 given a report ỹ. Note that because P0
is unaffected by disclosure’s properties, nothing may be learned from this price. Next, note that an arbitrary
two-dimensional vector (λ, η) cannot be derived from the single equation:







































Proof of Proposition 2. Again, applying Lemma 7, the price of an option with strike k ∈ (P1 (yL) , P1 (yH))
is equal to:
ΦC (k) = 2
(P1 (yH)− k) [Pr (x̃ = xH , ỹ = yH)u′ (xH) + Pr (x̃ = xL, ỹ = yH)u′ (xL)]
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
. (A.25)
Substituting the expression for P1 (yH) and simplifying yields:
ΦC (k) = 2 Pr (ỹ = yH)
Pr (x̃ = xH |yH) (xH − k)u′ (xH) + Pr (x̃ = xL|yH) (xL − k)u′ (xL)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
(A.26)
=
(λ− η) (xH − k)u′ (xH) + (1− λ− η) (xL − k)u′ (xL)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
.
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Proof of Part 1) Consider two utility functions u1 and u2 such that u1 is more risk averse than u2. Without
loss of generality (since utilities are ordinal), normalize u′1 (xL) = u
′






show now that A2 > A1. Note first that:




u′2 (xH) + ν
>
u′1 (xH)
u′1 (xH) + ν
⇔ u′2 (xH) > u′1 (xH) .
To see that u′2 (xH) > u
′
1 (xH), note:
u1 (xL) = u2 (xL) = ν and u1 (·) = g (u2 (·)) (A.28)
=⇒ g′ (u2 (xL))u′2 (xL) = u′2 (xL)
=⇒ g′ (u2 (xL)) = 1
=⇒ g′ (u2 (xH)) < 1.
Finally, using the fact that u′1 (xH) = g
′ (u2 (xH))u
′
2 (xH), we have desired result. Now, note that given a
utility function ui (·), Φ (k) may be expressed as:
ΦC (k) = (λ− η) (xH − k)Ai + (1− λ− η) (xL − k) (1−Ai) . (A.29)
Differentiating with respect to Ai yields:
∂ΦC (k)
∂Ai
= (λ− η) (xH − k)− (1− λ− η) (xL − k) . (A.30)
Note that this is decreasing in k and equal to zero when k = (λ−η)xH−(1−λ−η)xL
2λ−1 , the post-disclosure price
of the firm when the investor is risk neutral and ỹ = yH . As this is an upper bound on the price of the firm
given risk-aversion, any k with strike greater than this value pays off zero always. This completes the proof.






(λ− η) (xH − k)u′ (xH) + (1− λ− η) (xL − k)u′ (xL)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
(A.31)
=
u′ (xH) (xH − k)− u′ (xL) (xL − k)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
.
Note that, because k ∈ (xL, xH), this expression is definitively positive. To prove that this increases in
xH − xL, note that:
∂
∂ (xH − xL)
u′ (xH) (xH − k)− u′ (xL) (xL − k)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
= 1 > 0. (A.32)
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(λ− η) (xH − k)u′ (xH) + (1− λ− η) (xL − k)u′ (xL)
u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
(A.33)
= −u
′ (xH) (xH − k) + u′ (xL) (xL − k)









. Furthermore, note that this ex-













invertible system of equations in η and λ (these strikes were chosen arbitrarily in the interval (xL, xH):
ΦC (xL) =
(λ− η) (xH − xL)u′ (xH)


















u′ (xH) + u′ (xL)
.






[Ai (xH − k)− (1−Ai) (xL − k)] (A.35)
= xH + xL − 2k,
which has the sign of xH+xL
2
− k.





[Ai (xH − k) + (1−Ai) (xL − k)] (A.36)
= xL − xH < 0.
Since an increase in risk aversion translates to a decrease in Ai and an increase in disclosure’s informativeness
for good-versus-bad news translates to an increase in η, this proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let (Ω,F ,Π) now denote the probability space generating the distribution of
{Et (õ)}t∈[0,T ], õ, d̃ and ỹ denoted in the text and let {Ft : t ∈ [0, T ]} denote the filtration generated by the
Brownian motion Bt. I show that Lemma 7 extends to this setting. To see this, I appeal to the result from
martingale-pricing theory (e.g., Duffie (2010) pg. 217), that states when markets are complete and attention







u (c (ω)) dΠ (ω) (A.37)
s.t.
∫
c (ω)π (ω) dΠ (ω) = W0,
where π (·) is the unique stochastic discount factor. As in the proof of Lemma 7, taking first-order conditions
and substituting the market-clearing condition yields π (ω) = u
′(x(ω))
E[u′(x(ω))] . The expressions for the prices of
the equity and options now follow directly from the definition of the stochastic discount factor. To see that
































This is positive for ỹ = yH and negative for ỹ = yL. Option prices may likewise be shown to jump.
Proof of Proposition 3. To begin, I prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Let ΦD (k;u (·)) and PD (u (·)) represent the price of the call option with strike k and the pre-
disclosure price of the equity, respectively, in Section 3 when the representative investor has utility function




ΦCt (Pt, k, τD) = Φ
D
(


















































Pr (xH |ỹ)xHE [u′ (xH + õ) |FτD ] + Pr (xL|ỹ)xLE [u








Pr (xH |ỹ)E [u′ (xH + õ) |FτD ] + Pr (xL|ỹ)E [u′ (xL + õ) |FτD ]
=








Pr (xH |ỹ)h′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)h′ (xL)
,
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where h (z) ≡ E [u (õ+ z) |FτD ]. I note that h (z) is increasing and concave, which follows from differentia-





























Pr (xH |ỹ)xHh′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)xLh′ (xL)
Pr (xH |ỹ)h′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)h′ (xL)





where k∗ (Ft) = k−
E[õu′(d̃+õ)|FτD ]
Pr(xH |ỹ)h′(xH )+Pr(xL|ỹ)h′(xL)








Pr (xH |ỹ)xHh′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)xLh′ (xL)
Pr (xH |ỹ)h′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)h′ (xL)












Pr (xH |ỹ)xHh′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)xLh′ (xL)
Pr (xH |ỹ)h′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)h′ (xL)















Pr (xH |ỹ)xHh′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)xLh′ (xL)
Pr (xH |ỹ)h′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)h′ (xL)























Pr (xH |ỹ)xHh′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)xLh′ (xL)
Pr (xH |ỹ)h′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)h′ (xL)






− u′ (x̃) |Ft
]
.



























Now, letting fõ (·|Ft) be the distribution of õ given the information available at time t, note that an appli-









































38To apply the theorem, note that for z large, since u is concave, there exists a c > 0 such that u′ (z) < c,




< a + cz. Further applying the fact that fõ (z|Ft) is the PDF of a




fõ (z|Ft)→ 0 as z →∞ ∀t ∈ [0, τD]. From here, we can






where the last line follows from the fact that the distribution of õ given Ft is continuous in t for any tra-
jectory of this distribution, since it is log-normal with continuously evolving mean and variance parameters.












− u′ (x̃) |Ft
]
= 0.


















Pr (xH |ỹ)xHh′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)xLh′ (xL)
Pr (xH |ỹ)h′ (xH) + Pr (xL|ỹ)h′ (xL)






This is equal to ΦD
(





. To see this, recall that the post-disclosure
option price in Section 3 equals Pr(xH |ỹ)xHh
′(xH )+Pr(xL|ỹ)xLh′(xL)
Pr(xH |ỹ)h′(xH )+Pr(xL|ỹ)h′(xL)













Note that Proposition 2 implies that an increase in risk aversion or a decrease in λ leads to a decrease
in ΦD (k;h (·)) for any k and risk-averse h (·). Thus, by the previous lemma, that parts 1) and 2) of the
proposition generalize to the continuous-trade setting. Next, applying part 3) of Proposition 2 and the prior
lemma, we have that lim
t→τ−
D




and decreases in η otherwise. Note that this condition may be written:









which is exactly the condition for the option to be ITM prior to the disclosure; this demonstrates that part
3) of Proposition 2 generalizes to the continuous-trade setting. Finally, part 4) of the proposition follows
again from considering the price of options with two strikes; this yields an invertible set of equations in λ
and η.
I next prove that the results in Corollary 2 generalize to continuous time when u (·) exhibits non-increasing
risk aversion. To do so, I utilize the following result, which is a restatement of Gollier (2004), Proposition
24.
Lemma 9 Suppose u1 and u2 are increasing concave utility functions and that one of these functions exhibits
non-increasing absolute risk aversion. If u1 (·) is more risk averse than u2 (·) in the sense of Arrow-Pratt,
then u∗1 (r) ≡ E [u1 (r + z̃)] is more risk averse than u∗2 (r) ≡ E [u2 (r + z̃)] for any random variable z̃ that
is independent of all other modeled risks.
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Using this result, it is easily seen that an increase in the risk aversion of u (·) likewise increases the risk
aversion of the function h (·) defined in Lemma 8. Thus, we may again apply the arguments in the proof of
Corollary 2 to the continuous-trade setting.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, I show that pre-disclosure option prices rise in the disclosure’s informa-
tiveness. Given that the investor is risk neutral, we have that for t > τD, Pt = Et [õ] + ξ̃Ri . Since Et [õ] is
independent of ξ̃Ri and has the same distribution under R1 and R2, the distribution of Pt as of time any
time t > τD under R2 is second-order stochastic dominated by this distribution under R1. I next prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 10 The call option price ΦCt (Pt, k, τM ;Ri) following the disclosure (τM > τD), which is implicitly
a function of ξ̃Ri through Pt, is convex in ξ̃Ri .
Proof. Applying the law of iterated expectations, we have:
























where gt (z) ≡ Et [max (E [õ|FτM ] + z − k, 0)]. Note that Φ
C
t (Pt, k, τM ;Ri) is convex in ξ̃Ri if and only if










. To see that gt is convex, let fE[õ|Ft2 ]|Ft1
(·) denote the density

















(k − z) (k − z) > 0.
Now, applying second-order stochastic dominance, we have that ΦCt (Pt, k, τM ;R2) > Φ
C
t (Pt, k, τM ;R1).
Next, I show if all pre-disclosure option prices are higher under R2 than R1, R2 must be more informative























(EτD [õ] + q − k) fξ̃Ri (q) dq.
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(q) dq − ρ (k) .




ΦCt (Pt, k, τD;R2)− lim
t→τ−
D












ΦCt (Pt, k, τD;R2) > limt→τ−
D
ΦCt (Pt, k, τD;R1) ∀k. By varying t and using expres-








Proof of Proposition 5. First, I demonstrate that Definition 2 is sufficient for the results to hold. From










ΦCt (Pt, k, τD;R2)− lim
t→τ−
D
ΦCt (Pt, k, τD;R1) . (A.53)
If R2 is more informative for good-versus-bad news than R1, the left hand side of this equation is positive



















+ EτD [õ]. Necessity of
Definition 2 follows similarly, since, if lim
t→τ−
D
ΦCt (Pt, k, τD;R2) − limt→τ−
D
ΦCt (Pt, k, τD;R1) crosses zero











dq must cross zero
from below when z = E (d).
Proof of Proposition 6. Note that investor i maximizes the following objective function as a function of
consumption ci (ω):
Ei [u (ci (ω))] =
∫
ω∈Ω
u (ci (ω)) dΠi (ω) . (A.54)
Let Π (ω) =
∫
Πi (ω) di denote the average investor belief, and let κ̃i denote the Radon-Nikodym derivative
of Πi with respect to Π. Then, we can write the investor’s objective as:
EΠ [κ̃iu (c̃i)] ≡
∫
ω∈Ω
κi (ω)u (ci (ω)) dΠ (ω) . (A.55)
91
Now, the First Welfare Theorem implies that the competitive equilibrium in the model is Pareto optimal,
which implies that the equilibrium allocation of wealth, {ci (ω)}i∈[0,1] solves the following maximization
problem for some positive function λ (i):
max
∫
λ (i)EΠ [κ̃iu (c̃i)] di (A.56)
subject to
∫
ci (ω) di = xi (ω) .
Let u∗i (t) = EΠ [κ̃iu (c̃i) |c̃i = t]. It is easily seen that u∗ is increasing and concave by differentiation.









ci (ω) di = xi (ω) .
Standard results now imply that there exists a representative agent with concave utility u∗ (·) equal to the
value function of this maximization problem and beliefs Π (see, e.g., Back (2010) pg. 122).
A.3. Proofs of technical results in Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 5. First, note that any equilibrium must be characterized by a threshold type T such
that managers disclose when x̃ > T and do not otherwise. This follows because if a manager who observes
x1 prefers disclosure to nondisclosure, then so too must a manager who observes x2 > x1. For such a T to be
an equilibrium, we must have that T −E (x̃|x̃ < T ) = c. To show such a T exists, note that T −E (x̃|x̃ < T )
is continuous in T and:
lim
T→∞
[T − E (x̃|x̃ < T )] = lim
T→∞
T − E (x̃) =∞. (A.58)
By assumption, either limT→−∞ [T − E (x̃|x̃ < T )] = 0 or x̃ has a lower bound. In the first case, we have
that limT→−∞ [T − E (x̃|x̃ < T )] < c, and the intermediate value theorem may be applied. In the second
case, note that as T approaches the lower bound of x̃, T −E (x̃|x̃ < T ) approaches zero, and the intermediate
value theorem may again be applied. Uniqueness follows from Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), who show
that log-concavity of Fx implies that:
∂
∂z
[T − E (x̃|x̃ < T )] > 0. (A.59)
The implicit function theorem further implies that T (c) is differentiable and increasing in c. To see that the
firm’s pre-disclosure price equals E (x̃)− c (1− Fx (T (c))), note that risk-neutrality implies that the equity
price is equal to the expected firm payoffs. This equals E (x̃) less the expected disclosure costs.
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Proof of Proposition 7. First, suppose that k < E (x̃|x̃ < T (c)). Such an option pays off with probability
1. Thus, since the equity price is a martingale,
ΦC0 (k) = E (max (P1 − k, 0)) (A.60)
= E (P1 − k) = P0 − k.
Next, suppose that k > E (x̃|x̃ < T (c)). Then, by applying a change of variables, we have:
















zfx (z) dz − c (1− Fx (k + c))− k (1− Fx (k + c))
= E (x̃|x̃ > k + c) (1− Fx (k + c))− (c+ k) (1− Fx (k + c)) .
Now, suppose that k = E (x̃|x̃ < T (c)). Then,




(r − k) fP1 (r) dr + Pr (x̃ = k) [max (x̃− k, 0)]x̃=k
= E (x̃|x̃ > k + c) (1− Fx (k + c))− (c+ k) (1− Fx (k + c)) .
Proof of Lemma 6. Note that the equilibrium strategy must be characterized by a threshold such that
the manager who knows x̃ discloses when x̃ > h (t) and does not disclose otherwise. This holds because the
payoff to disclosure increases in the manager’s information, but the payoff to nondisclosure is unaffected by
the manager’s information. In such an equilibrium, letting NDt represent the event of nondisclosure at time
t, It the event the manager is informed at time t, and Ut the event the manager is uninformed at time t, the
market’s beliefs in the absence of a disclosure are characterized by:
fx|NDt (z|NDt) = Pr (It|NDt) fx|NDt (z|NDt, It) + Pr (Ut|NDt) fx|ND (z|NDt, Ut) (A.63)
=
FτA (t) fx (z) I (z < h (t))
FτA (t)Fx (h (t)) + 1− FτA (t)
+
1− FτA (t)










−∞ zfx (z) dz
FτA (t)Fx (h (t)) + 1− FτA (t)
+
(1− FτA (t))E (x̃)
FτA (t)Fx (h (t)) + 1− FτA (t)
.
Now, the manager who knows the firm’s value equals x discloses whenever x ≥ PNDt , which implies that




PNDt − h (t) = E (x̃)− (−∞) ; (A.65)
lim
h(t)→∞




PNDt − h (t)
)
< 0.
Moreover, applying standard results from Jung and Kwon (1988), it is easily verified that ∂h(t)
∂t
< 0 and









−∞ zfx (z) dz
FτA (t)Fx (h (t)) + 1− FτA (t)
+
(1− FτA (t))E (x̃)




[FτA (t)Fx (h (t)) + 1− FτA (t)]FτA (t)h (t) fx (h (t))







−∞ zfx (z) dz
(FτA (t)Fx (h (t)) + 1− FτA (t))
2 +
(1− FτA (t))FτA (t) fx (h (t))E (x̃)
(FτA (t)Fx (h (t)) + 1− FτA (t))
2
= fx (h (t))F
2
τA (t) (h (t)− E (x|x < h (t))Fx (h (t)))
(1− FτA (t))FτA (t) fx (h (t)) (h (t) + E (x̃)) ,
which is positive.
Proof of Proposition 8. We have that:
ΦC0 (k, τM ) = E (max (PτM − k, 0)) . (A.67)
In the case that k < PNDτM , PτM > k with probability 1, and thus, Φ
C
0 (k, τM ) = E (PτM ) − k = E (x̃) − k.
Now, in the case that k ≥ PNDτM , we have:
ΦC0 (k, τM ) = E (max (PτM − k, 0)) (A.68)
= FτA (τM )E (max (PτM − k, 0) |τA < τM )
= FτA (τM ) (1− Fx (h (τM ))) (E (x̃|x̃ > h (τM ))− k) .
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Proof of Corollary 3. Note that k > E (x̃) =⇒ k > PNDτM . Thus,
ΦC0 (k, τM ) = FτA (τM ) (1− Fx (h (τM ))) (E (x̃|x̃ > h (τM ))− k) . (A.69)
The first part of the corollary thus holds by the definition of MLR dominance. To show the second part of
the corollary, I first show that
h (τM ) = Sh
U (τM ) , (A.70)
where hU (τM ) is independent of S. To see this, again note that h (τM ) solves:
Pr (IτM |NDτM )E (x̃|x̃ < h (τM )) + Pr (UτM |NDτM )E (x̃) = h (τM ) . (A.71)
Manipulating this expression yields:
Pr (IτM |NDτM )E
(
θ̃|θ̃ < h (τM )
S
)








Letting hU (τM ) be the solution z to:













FτA (τM1) (1− Fx (h (τM1))) (E (x̃|x̃ > h (τM1))− E (x̃))
































































Note that this is independent of S.
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A.4. Proofs of technical results in Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 9. Investor i’s first-order conditions with respect to their equity and derivative







































Under the conjecture that FPD (·|PS , µ̃) = FPD (·|PS), the derivative price serves no role in updating on µ̃,
and hence, its distribution is irrelevant in determining the posterior distribution of µ̃ given the investors’
information. Consequently, upon conditioning on the uncertain variance Ṽ , due to the linearity of PS and
ϕ̃i in µ̃, the investors’ belief regarding x̃ is normally distributed: x̃|Ṽ ,Φi ∼ N
(
E (x̃|Φi) , V ar (µ̃|Φi) + Ṽ
)
.


















































D2Si −DDi − Z̃V i
)
Ṽ .
As we show in the proof of Proposition 10, Ṽ |Φi lies in the exponential family and thus has a moment-








< ∞. This implies that
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Substituting this result into the first equation in expression (A.79) and rearranging, we find:
[




































Solving for DSi yields:
DSi = τ
E (µ̃|Φi)− PS − 1τ V ar (µ̃|Φi) Z̃µi
PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
. (A.82)
The condition for market clearing requires that
∫ 1
0




E (µ̃|Φi)− PS − 1τ V ar (µ̃|Φi) Z̃µi
PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
di = z̄. (A.83)










z̄ (PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)) . (A.84)








. We wish to show that d
dt









In order to do so, we apply the dominated convergence theorem. We show that, for any sequence {tn} with
tn → t, there exists a function κ (V ) such that:∣∣∣∣− exp (tnV )− exp (tV )tn − t
∣∣∣∣ < κ (V )
and E (κ (V )) < ∞. To find such a κ (V ), note that the mean value theorem implies that there exists a ξ
between tn and t such that: ∣∣∣∣− exp (tnV )− exp (tV )tn − t
∣∣∣∣ = |−ξV exp (ξV )|
= ξV exp (ξV )





V j = exp (V ), we get that ξV exp (ξV ) < exp ((ξ + 1)V ). Letting
κ (V ) = exp ((ξ + 1)V ), and using the fact that the MGF exists for all reals, we have the result.
40Since we may change the order of differentiation and expectation, and the utility function is concave,
the second order condition holds.
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In the proof of Proposition 11, we show that there is a unique linear equilibrium price that satisfies this
equation.











Proof of Proposition 10. We start by conjecturing a generalized linear equilibrium, as in Breon-Drish
(2015b). Specifically, conjecture that price satisfies:
PD
(






Ṽ + υ̃, z̃V
))
(A.85)
where δ′ > 0
and l
(











= FPS (·|PD), we
have that FṼ |PD,PS ,η̃i,Z̃V i = FṼ |PD,η̃i,Z̃V i . As δ
′ > 0, investors can invert the linear statistic l
(
Ṽ + υ̃, z̃V
)
from price, and hence, the information in PD is equivalent to l̃
(
Ṽ + υ̃, z̃V
)
: FṼ |PD,η̃i,Z̃V i = FṼ |l̃,η̃i,Z̃V i .












. Therefore, conditional on Φi, investor i
′s belief distribution
regarding Ṽ satisfies (where differential notation simply indicates that the distribution of Ṽ may exhibit
discontinuities):
dFṼ |l̃,η̃i,Z̃V i (y) (A.86)
∝ dFṼ (y) dFZ̃V i (ZV i) dFl̃,η̃i|Ṽ ,Z̃V i (l, ηi)




















































 dldηidFṼ (y) .






































 dldηidFṼ (y) . (A.87)
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Defining this final expression as J (y; l, ηi, ZV i), we may write:
dFṼ |l̃,η̃i,Z̃V i (y) =
J (y; l, ηi, ZV i)∫
Υ
J (x; l, ηi, ZV i) dx
. (A.88)
This distribution belongs to the exponential family, i.e., it may be written in the form
exp
{(




k1 (a) η̃i + k2 (a) l̃ + k3 (a) Z̃V i
)}































































































































k1 (a) η̃i + k2 (a) l̃ + k3 (a) Z̃V i
)}
.

























































































k1 (a) η̃i + k2 (a) l̃ + k3 (a) Z̃V i −
1
τ
















k1 (a) η̃i + k2 (a) l̃ + k3 (a) Z̃V i
)










k1 (a) η̃i + k2 (a) l̃ + k3 (a) Z̃V i
)








Z̃V idi = 0. (A.92)



















In order for this to satisfy our conjecture that price depends on Ṽ and z̃V only through the linear statistic
l
(












+ z̃V . This is equivalent to
τk1(a)
τk3(a)−1






































































As this is a cubic equation with positive third-order and constant terms, it has at least one negative solution.
































∗) + k3 (a







where a∗ is a solution to equation (A.94). Letting r (a∗) = τ (k2 (a
∗) + k3 (a
∗)) − 1, we have the result in
the statement of the proof. We prove that PD increases in Ṽ and υ̃ and decreases in z̃V in the proof of
Proposition 11.
Proof of Corollary 5. Expression (3.9) shows the only dependence of PD on µ̃ is through the term,∫ 1
0








E (x̃|Φi)− PS − τ−1V ar (µ̃|Φi) Z̃µi











E (x̃|Φi) di− τ−1z̃µiV ar (µ̃|Φi) + τ−1z̄ (PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi))
































− z̃µiV ar (µ̃|Φi)
]2
di does not depend on µ̃. To see this, note that




is linear in PS , Z̃µi and ϕ̃i. Moreover, because investors’ information precisions are homogenous, they apply


















D0 +D1ϕ̃i +D2Z̃µi +D3PS
)
















ε + (D2 − V ar (µ̃|Φi))2 σ2zµi .
Since this is not a function of µ̃, the conjecture has been verified.
Proof of Proposition 11. Using the results from Proposition 9 and Proposition 10, a rational expectations
equilibrium must simultaneously satisfy the following three conditions:
(1) DSi = τ
E (x̃|Φi)− PS − τ−1Z̃µiV ar (µ̃|Φi)
PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
(A.98)
(2) a∗ solves equation A.94, and (A.99)







∗) + k3 (a







Note that the first condition itself contains a fixed-point problem in the sense that E (x̃|Φi) is a function of
PS , which is impacted by investors’ demands DSi. We first show that fixing PD, there is a unique solution
to this fixed-point problem, i.e., there is a unique equilibrium in the equity market given PD. To begin, we












PS |ϕ̃i, Z̃µi, PD
))
, (A.101)




−ACov (x̃, PS |ϕi, Zµi, PD) .
The following facts may be easily verified by utilizing the variance-covariance matrix of x̃, PS , ϕ̃i, Z̃µi and
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PS |ϕ̃i, Z̃µi, PD
)


























m+ σ2µ (µ+ n)






















































































σ2n + σ2µ + σ2ε (1−A)
.




































Substituting, we arrive at a cubic equation in A∗ that is positive when A∗ = 1 and negative when A∗ = 0.
This implies the existence of a solution A∗ ∈ (0, 1) and hence the existence of a solution to equilibrium








E (x̃|Φi)− PS − τ−1Z̃µiV ar (µ̃|Φi)





(PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi))2
,


















∗) + k3 (a













∗) + k3 (a
∗))− 1) l̃ + 1
2τ
B (A∗)













∗) + k3 (a










unique zero, then, by equilibrium condition 2, we can solve for the unique PD. Hence, we will have proven
that there exists a unique rational expectations equilibrium for each solution a∗ to equation (A.94) and
solution A∗ to equation (A.106). To show that this is the case, note first that g′ is continuous. Thus, noting
















∗) + k3 (a
∗))− 1) l̃ + 1
2τ
B (A∗)








∗) + k3 (a

























∗) + k3 (a
∗))− 1) l̃ + 1
2τ
B (A∗)
































∗) + k3 (a
∗))− 1) l̃ + 1
2τ
B (A∗)
(PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi))2
]))
= 1 + 2g′′ ∗ B (A
∗)
τ (PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi))3
,
which is positive given that g′′ > 0.41 Finally, we demonstrate that dPD
dzV
< 0 and dPD
dV
> 0. Applying









has the sign of











= (τ (k2 (a







∗) + k3 (a
∗))− 1) l̃ + 1
2τ
B









= a∗ (τ (k2 (a







∗) + k3 (a
∗))− 1) l̃ + 1
2τ
B




























































− 1 < 0,






> 0. This completes the proof.















E (x̃|Φi) di− τ−1V ar (µ̃|Φi) z̃µi
PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
∣∣∣∣∣ di.










































PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣∣E (x̃|Φi)− ∫ 1
0
E (x̃|Φi) di− τ−1V ar (µ̃|Φi) z̃µi
∣∣∣∣ di (A.117)
is trivially decreasing in PD. Applying the chain rule and the fact that PD increases in Ṽ and υ̃ and declines
























E (x̃|Φi)− PS − τ−1Z̃µiV ar (µ̃|Φi)







E (x̃|Φi)− PS − τ−1Z̃µiV ar (µ̃|Φi)







PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi)
)2 [(











Thus, V olD is affected by Ṽ , υ̃, and z̃V through PD. Define Bi ≡
(





E (x̃|Φi)− PS − τ−1Z̃µiV ar (µ̃|Φi)
)2
di, Ψ ≡ τ
2
(PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi))2, and Y = τk1 (a) ẽi+(τk3 (a)− 1) z̃V i.










Applying a similar technique as in the proof of Corollary 5, it can be seen that Bi is not affected by PD.
































































































































−∞BidFBi = E (Bi) = 0. Again applying the chain rule and the fact that PD
increases in Ṽ and υ̃ and declines in z̃V completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 7. The proof follows by considering the directional effect of a change in each of the
random parameters of the model, z̃µ, z̃V , Ṽ , and µ̃, on ∆PS , ∆PD, V olS , and V olD. By examining the
comparative statics that are implied by the results of propositions 9, 10, and 12, we find that any change in
the underlying random variables that causes the stock price to increase causes volume in both markets to
either remain constant or increase. Likewise, any change in an underlying random variable that causes the
derivative price to increase leads volume in both markets to remain constant or decrease.
Proof of Proposition 13.

























































(z̃µiV ar (µ̃|Φi))2 di
]
+ z̄2,





















z̄ (PD + V ar (µ̃|Φi))
]
(A.127)
= E (x̃)− 1
τ
z̄ (E (PD) + V ar (µ̃|Φi)) .
Hence, an increase in BeliefDispersion that leaves V ar (µ̃|Φi) unchanged only affects E (PS) through PD;
given that PD increases in BeliefDispersion, E (PS) decreases in BeliefDispersion.
Proof of Proposition 14. i) This follows from the proof of Proposition 13.
















iii) This follows from an examination of expression (3.5).
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